

A Structured-Renegotiation Theory of Corporate Bankruptcy

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Abstract

This Article presents a new theory of corporate bankruptcy. The purpose of a well-functioning bankruptcy system is to solve the incomplete contracting problem that accompanies financial distress. Financial distress has the recurring characteristic of presenting noncontractible uncertainty. By its very nature, financial distress is hard to contract over—the time horizon, the number of parties, and the number of contingencies render the possible scenarios too numerous to define and negotiate in an ex ante contract. As a result, relationships involving a distressed firm are governed by incomplete contracts that allow parties to hold each other up. Because all firms face this same value-destroying problem, pressure arises for a uniform solution.

The American bankruptcy system responds to this pressure by creating a structured-renegotiation framework designed to minimize hold-up behavior among those with interests in a distressed firm. That framework allocates power over certain decisions to one party but then imposes evidentiary burdens, judicial pricing mechanisms, and other conditions on the exercise (or removal) of that power. The initial allocation of power and the burdens for altering it are based on the law's assessment of where the hold-up risks lie. Within this framework and under the oversight of the court, the parties renegotiate their incomplete contracts.

This Article shows that widely-accepted alternative theories—which focus on a hypothetical creditors' bargain and nonbankruptcy entitlements—are wrong. Bankruptcy is not about a hypothetical bargain, and a proper bankruptcy system gives no special deference to nonbankruptcy entitlements. Instead, the structured-renegotiation framework is the fundamental attribute of our bankruptcy law. It better explains the rules that prevail in our current system and provides clearer guidance on the frontier questions with which courts and scholars struggle.

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Introduction

Corporate bankruptcy law’s purpose is to solve the incomplete contracting problem that accompanies financial distress. The American bankruptcy system achieves that purpose by facilitating a structured renegotiation that allows parties to preserve value in the face of hold-up threats. The creation of a framework for that efficient renegotiation is the fundamental attribute of our bankruptcy law. As with any efficiency-oriented system, a proper bankruptcy law must take into account unintended consequences and distortions that might destroy value in other states of the world. And so, bankruptcy’s core purpose brings with it two scope limitations: First, the structured renegotiation should be directed specifically at problems that arise from incomplete contracting. Second, the framework should not include measures that destroy more value in other states of the world than they preserve in the distressed state.

Thus, contrary to the prevailing view of bankruptcy scholars and many lawyers, the purpose of bankruptcy law is not to create a system of rules set up to vindicate or mimic some hypothetical *ex ante* bargain among creditors.¹ This idea—known as the Creditors’ Bargain theory²—is a decent shorthand for the basic assumption that we want to achieve efficiency. To be sure, in a hypothetical world of perfect and symmetric information, zero transaction costs, and rational behavior, the collection of all interested parties (assuming that we know how to properly define who is an “interested party”) would agree to efficient rules that

¹ This prevailing view derives from the early scholarship of Professors Baird and Jackson. See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, *Bankruptcy, Non-bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain*, 91 Yale L. J. 857, 860 (1982) (introducing the idea that bankruptcy law should “mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an *ex ante* position”); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, *Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain*, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 835-36 (1985) (noting that the “ambition” of bankruptcy law is to provide the contract the parties would have agreed to in the hypothetical bargain). While much of this Article challenges the Creditors’ Bargain theory, these criticisms are in line with Baird’s own more recent scholarship on bankruptcy theory. In several articles, Baird has begun to chip away at the theoretical usefulness and applicability of the theory. See, for example, Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, *The End of Bankruptcy*, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755 (2002); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, *Antibankruptcy*, 119 Yale L. J. 648, 652-53 (2010). This Article picks up where Baird’s recent scholarship leaves off. I try to bring cohesion to an emerging scholarship that implicitly challenges the Creditors’ Bargain theory.

² Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 at 858.

minimize value destruction in all states of the world. But that is a truism. All-knowing rational actors will indeed bargain for the efficient outcome when bargaining costs are zero.³ But what should the law do when bargaining costs are high and information is limited? That is the question that bankruptcy law faces. The answer that the law should do what the parties would do in an efficient and complete contract just restates the core question: How should the law deal with ex ante uncertainty about financial distress?

Even worse, the Creditors' Bargain framework often leads scholars to focus on the wrong questions. For example, by focusing attention on the ex ante bargain, the framework has attracted proposals focused on bringing all the creditors to the ex ante bargaining table.⁴ But the real problem for any bankruptcy contract—or legislation—is not in convening the bargainers. It is rather in writing enforceable ex ante rules in the face of uncertainty. This is a classic problem in law,⁵ and the Creditors' Bargain distracts from its importance. In a sense, the uncertainty of financial distress presents the problem that parties cannot write a complete contract, and the Creditors' Bargain theory responds unhelpfully by instructing lawmakers—who face the same uncertainty—to write that complete contract for them.⁶

The Creditors' Bargain theory has also nurtured the fallacy that bankruptcy law should be about preserving nonbankruptcy entitlements.⁷ This idea—often referred to as the Butner

³ Ronald H. Coase, *The Problem of Social Cost*, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960).

⁴ See, for example, Barry E. Adler and Marcel Kahan, *The Technology of Creditor Protection*, 161 Pa. L. Rev. 1773, 1794-1809 (2013) (proposing a mechanism to facilitate contracting over remedies against third parties); Robert K. Rasmussen, *A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy*, 71 Texas L. Rev. 51, 100-11 (1992) (proposing a menu system to facilitate investor assent); David A. Skeel Jr., *Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy*, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 525 (1994) (proposing state law systems that encourage private ordering); Alan Schwartz, *Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts*, 36 J. L. & Econ. 595, 630-31 (1993) (advocating private resolutions in the place of mandatory bankruptcy rules).

⁵ The problem stems from the inability to write complete ex ante rules. In contract law it leads to incomplete contracting. Oliver Hart and John Moore, *Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation*, 56 Econometrica 755, 756 (1988); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, *Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules*, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 92-93 (1989). In public law it leads to the adoption of vague standards. Louis Kaplow, *Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis*, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 563 (1992).

⁶ Similarly, the framework attracts empirical projects that attempt to identify or predict what creditors have or would have agreed to. That is not a relevant inquiry. See below at Part II.D.i.

⁷ The phrase “nonbankruptcy entitlement” refers to the rights that parties have when bankruptcy law does not apply. These rights exist by operation of statute, contract, or any other source of law that is unconnected with the bankruptcy system. Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 at 858.

Principle⁸—is a corollary to the Creditors’ Bargain theory and is often viewed as an additional source from which to derive bankruptcy’s core purposes.⁹ But this gets things exactly wrong. The bankruptcy system functions almost exclusively by doing the opposite—it achieves its purpose specifically by interfering with nonbankruptcy entitlements.¹⁰

This fallacy—that the Butner Principle is fundamental to bankruptcy theory—arises, perhaps, from a distorted

⁸ Baird and Jackson coined the term by “grabbing onto a phrase from an otherwise forgettable Supreme Court case [*Butner v. United States*].” Thomas Jackson, *A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers*, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1867, 1872 (2018) (citing *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48 (1979)). The Court’s opinion in *Butner* presented a rather vanilla cannon of textualist interpretation: The Bankruptcy Code does not include provisions that are not in or implied by its text or policy. *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. at 55. Baird and Jackson consciously transformed this idea into a broader normative statement of a core bankruptcy principle. See Jackson (2018), at 1872-73 n. 18.

⁹ For the original formations of the Butner Principle, see Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 at 859-60; Thomas H. Jackson, *THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW* at 21, 28 (Harvard 1986); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, *Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy*, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 110 (1984) (noting that bankruptcy is primarily focused on “recognizing nonbankruptcy entitlements”). For examples of its importance as a core theory and its expanded predominance over time, see, for example, Jackson (2018), *supra* note 8 at 1873-72 (identifying the Butner Principle as the starting point that brought clarity to the Creditors’ Bargain theory); Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., *Bankruptcy Law as Liquidity Provider*, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1557, 1565 (2013), (describing this as the second element of the theoretical foundation of corporate bankruptcy); Melissa B. Jacoby and Edward J. Janger, *Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy*, 123 Yale L. J. 862, 892 (2014) (proposing a system with “careful attention to the scope of non-bankruptcy entitlements”); Melissa B. Jacoby and Edward J. Janger, *Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11*, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 673, 682-83, 734 (2018) (deriving bankruptcy’s core principles by tracing creditors’ state-law entitlements); Bruce A. Markell, *Fair Equivalents and Market Prices: Bankruptcy Cramdown Interest Rates*, 33 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 91, 127 (2016) (deriving cramdown rules from nonbankruptcy entitlements); Ronald J. Mann, *Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money is it Anyway?*, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 993, 1000 (1995) (presenting a bankruptcy theory that “starts from entitlements of the parties that exist before the bankruptcy system comes into play”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., *A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure*, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 931, 934 (2004) (“[B]ankruptcy law should exist, essentially, in order to serve the interests of the holders of nonbankruptcy legal entitlements.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, *When Does Some Federal Interest Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States*, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 657, 665 (2015) (noting the iconic stature of the Butner Principle and the fact that it has been cited thousands of times); Barry E. Adler, *The Questionable Axiom of Butner v. United States in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES* (Robert K. Rasmussen ed. 2007) (noting but questioning the principle’s place as a “cherished axiom” of bankruptcy theory); David Gray Carlson, *Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors Bargain*, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 453, 466 (1992) (critiquing the principle).

¹⁰ I have made this point elsewhere. Anthony J. Casey, *Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect*, 33 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 141, 142 (2016); see also Thomas H. Jackson and Robert E. Scott, *On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain*, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 169 (1989) (recognizing that any bankruptcy system will “inevitably” alter nonbankruptcy rights).

understanding of bankruptcy’s scope limitations.¹¹ Bankruptcy law should be targeted at problems created by financial distress¹² and should only destroy nonbankruptcy value when doing so is efficient—that is, when there is greater offsetting value creation in bankruptcy.¹³ That is not the same thing as saying that bankruptcy law should protect or give special respect to nonbankruptcy entitlements. The scope limitations merely provide that bankruptcy law should not be put into effect without a good reason. The question remains as to what qualifies as a good bankruptcy reason.

All of this is to say, the law-and-economics theory of corporate bankruptcy needs to be restated. This paper does that. This move is not extreme. In fact, though many scholars and lawyers invoke the Creditors’ Bargain theory and the Butner Principle, very few rely on their substance being true. The building blocks of the new theory can be found in much of today’s bankruptcy scholarship, which usually advocates general efficiency goals,¹⁴ often notes the importance of ex post bargaining,¹⁵ and sometimes notes the importance of procedure over substance.¹⁶ Most scholars and

¹¹ Though Jackson talks of the principle as foundational to the Creditors’ Bargain, Baird and Jackson are the most careful in noting that the Butner Principle yields to compelling bankruptcy purposes. Jackson (2018), *supra* note 8 at 1872 n. 18 (including the limitation “without a clearly defined bankruptcy-related reason for doing so”); Jackson (1986), *supra* note 11 at 21 (“necessary as a part of the move from the individual remedies system”); Baird and Jackson, *supra* note 9 at 100 (“only when doing so preserves the value of assets for the group of investors holding rights in them.”); see also Robert E. Scott, *Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors’ Bargain Heuristic*, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev., 690, 692 (1986). In Baird’s and Jackson’s view, Butner might be thought of a guide that we should discard only with a deliberate purpose. In this framing, the idea does more to identify the importance of finding a bankruptcy purpose than to define the purpose itself. In subsequent decades, the idea has grown much beyond this useful idea of limiting bankruptcy law to bankruptcy purposes. See *supra* note 9.

¹² See discussion below at Part II.D. See Douglas G. Baird, *Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms*, 108 Yale L. J. 573 (1998).

¹³ See below at Part II.C.

¹⁴ See, for example, Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1566 (invoking the Creditors’ Bargain but advocating a general “Efficiency Principle”).

¹⁵ See, for example, Diane Lourdes Dick, *The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy*, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 759, 766 (2013) (noting and critiquing the common view that bankruptcy law facilitates efficient renegotiation); Daniel J. Bussel and Kenneth N. Klee, *Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy*, 83 Am. Bank. L.J. 663, 669 (2009) (bankruptcy alters nonbankruptcy rights to facilitate consent); G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. and Mike Sigal, *Competitive Choice Theory and the Broader Implications of the Supreme Court’s Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North Lasalle Street Partnership*, 54 Bus. Law 1475, 1483–85 (1999) (bankruptcy creates “a better decision-making environment”); Omar Tene, *Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations*, 19 Bankr. Dev. J. 287, 396 (2003) (bankruptcy should provide a platform for negotiation); see also Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 699 (noting the importance of renegotiation).

¹⁶ See for example, Pamela Foohey, *Jevic’s Promise: Procedural Justice in Chapter 11*, 93 Wash. L. Rev. Online 128 (2018); Mooney, *supra* note 9, 934-35.

lawyers also agree that corporate bankruptcy has something to do with facilitating cooperation among stakeholders.¹⁷ I do not depart from the current literature on these basic points. The challenge is in clearing away the distracting brush of old theories to discover the proper theory.

Thus, this paper presents and justifies a new structured-renegotiation theory of corporate bankruptcy. The theory rests on three foundational points.

First, bankruptcy's core purpose is to solve a specific contracting failure. That failure arises because financial distress presents uncertainty that is not contractible. For a business firm, financial distress involves too many parties and too many contingencies for the firm and its creditors to define a set of rules for every scenario.¹⁸ As a result, when a corporate debtor encounters distress its various relationships are necessarily governed by incomplete contracts. The parties in those relationships, then, have the opportunity and incentive to use the incompleteness to extract individual gains from each other—to hold each other up. Any party who has specifically invested in its relationship with the debtor is vulnerable to this hold-up threat.¹⁹

The problem cannot be solved by ex ante rules—in either a contract or a statute. Indeed, the problem arises precisely because no one can write such rules. This is a familiar problem in law, and there is nothing theoretically special about it in bankruptcy. But there is something empirically special. The noncontractible uncertainty associated with financial distress is a recurring characteristic across all debtor firms. Where every relationship of a certain type is expected to be incomplete and require judicial intervention upon the occurrence of the same event, there exists an argument and market pressure for a uniform procedure to deal with the problem.

Second, the American bankruptcy system attempts to solve this problem by creating a renegotiation space designed to minimize the parties' ability and incentive to defect from the

¹⁷ Alan Schwartz, *A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy*, 107 Yale L. J. 1807, 1808 (1998) (noting that bankruptcy solves a coordination problem). Baird and Jackson sometimes described bankruptcy as a solution to the collective action problem facing creditors racing after assets. See Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 861-62; Douglas G. Baird, *Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren*, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 827 (1987). Subsequent scholarship has expanded our understanding of bankruptcy as reaching beyond the race for assets to include various other scenarios where bankruptcy facilitates cooperation among stakeholders. See below at Part I.A.

¹⁸ See below at Part II.A.ii.

¹⁹ Oliver Hart, *Incomplete Contracts and Control*, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 1731, 1733 (2017); Hart and Moore, *supra* note 5 at 757.

common goal of value maximization. It creates a complex framework under judicial oversight that allocates ex post power over certain decisions to one party but then imposes certain evidentiary burdens, price mechanisms, and other conditions on the exercise (or removal) of that power. The initial allocation of power and the burdens for triggering or removing it are based on the law's assessment of the likelihood that the decision in question is subject to the incomplete contracting and hold-up problems and on a calculation about how best to reduce that likelihood. In practical application, this often involves a combination of substantive outer limits and requirements that a party exercising power pay a market fee or meet some extremely high evidentiary burden to proving that they are not engaged in hold-up behavior.

Third, bankruptcy law is limited to addressing this specific contracting failure. Anything broader quickly becomes limitless and turns into an unworkable theory of general welfare and fails to achieve any purpose. That primarily means that the structured renegotiation should be targeted at relieving hold-up problems that arise from incomplete contracting over financial distress. Because the potential for hold up arises specifically when parties have made investments specific to relationships that involve or link in some way to the debtor,²⁰ bankruptcy law will focus on regulating ex post behavior that might take advantage of those investments. It is also—more obviously—limited to solutions that preserve more value than they destroy.

Bankruptcy, then is not about mimicking a hypothetical bargain. It is about facilitating an actual bargain. The structured-renegotiation framework does this. Because of the high level of ex ante uncertainty, the system relies mostly on procedural protection rather than specific substantive prescriptions. Moreover, because the system relies on judges as neutral outside arbiters, it provides them wide procedural discretion to define the bargaining parameters but leaves most substantive decisions to ex post bargaining among the parties—subject to the scope limitation on relative value destruction.

This is the structured-renegotiation theory of bankruptcy stated generally. I will provide the specifics below and demonstrate that questions of cramdown, executory contracts, forum shopping, the automatic stay, third-party releases, intercreditor agreements, priority rules, and the like can all be

²⁰ Hart and Moore, *supra* note 5 at 757. See below at Part II.D.

understood and explained by a proper application of this theory. Two key features are worth highlighting now: First, ex post bargaining is front and center. That is where bankruptcy happens. That is not to say that I am rejecting the idea of ex ante efficiency. An efficient bankruptcy system is focused on solving the ex post problem if, but only if, it can do so without creating bigger problems in other states of the world. This presents a meaningful limitation on the scope of any bankruptcy measure. Second, the system relies heavily on judicial discretion and procedural measures that facilitate the ex post bargain. Substantive measures—including value redistribution and deviations from nonbankruptcy priority—only come into play to facilitate the bargain by realigning incentives or minimizing distortions that might otherwise occur. Notably, I do not claim that the current bankruptcy code achieves its goal perfectly—judicial error and misaligned incentives do exist. But the structured-renegotiation theory provides a normatively desirable foundation for corporate bankruptcy law, and it coherently explains the major aspects of our current system.

The paper proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the usefulness and shortcomings of the Creditors' Bargain theory, the Butner Principle, and other heuristics that have been used to describe the core purpose of bankruptcy law. Part II provides the framework and foundation of the structured-renegotiation theory of corporate bankruptcy. Part III demonstrates the usefulness and general applicability of this emerging theory.

I. Moving Beyond the Creditors' Bargain

An interesting thing has happened to corporate bankruptcy scholarship. The Creditors' Bargain theory and the Butner Principle are widely and routinely invoked by scholars as the foundational principles of corporate bankruptcy,²¹ but virtually none of those scholars believes that the theory or the principle is correct (normatively or descriptively). Indeed, most corporate bankruptcy scholars point to the Creditors' Bargain theory and the Butner Principle as their analytical foundation, but then criticize aspects of the theory and proceed to build their analysis

²¹ See Douglas G. Baird, *Priority Matters*, 165 U. Ill. L. Rev. 785, 792 (2017) ("Framing the question as one about the hypothetical ex ante bargain among investors has been the standard trope in reorganization scholarship ever since Jackson introduced the creditors' bargain model in the early 1980s); *id.* at 789 (noting the goal of reorganization to "respect nonbankruptcy bargain among the investors").

on a more generic efficiency foundation.²² The result is that when a scholar invokes the “Creditors’ Bargain,” she conveys little more than a general commitment to an efficiency analysis of bankruptcy.²³

In this Part, I reflect on the initial appeal of the Creditors’ Bargain theory and the Butner Principle and then identify their theoretical shortcomings. While the Butner Principle is often referred to as a quintessential part of the Creditors’ Bargain theory,²⁴ I attempt to disentangle the two ideas. I argue that the Creditors’ Bargain theory was a useful analytical tool for demonstrating certain important principles, but one that never provided a complete theory to explain the purpose, reach, or limitations of a corporate bankruptcy system. The Butner Principle, in contrast, was at best a misunderstood shorthand for the idea that bankruptcy law should be limited in scope. In application it provides little guidance and instead draws scholars and courts to misleading and circular inquiries.

Corporate bankruptcy scholars have also developed a series of additional heuristics and rules of thumb to further explain or supplement the Creditors’ Bargain. The leading ones include the single-owner principle and the rule of general averages. These are useful for understanding aspects of our corporate bankruptcy

²² See, for example, Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1566 (invoking the Creditors’ Bargain theory but rejecting what they call the “Normative Butner Principle” and suggesting an “Efficiency Principle” instead); Mark J. Roe and Frederick Tung, *Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain*, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1235, 1269 (2013) (noting that the Creditors’ Bargain theory does not match reality on the ground); Schwartz, *supra* note 17 at 1809 (arguing that bankruptcy is just about increasing efficiency by solving a coordination problem); Yaad Rotem, *Pursuing Preservation of Pre-Bankruptcy Entitlements: Corporate Bankruptcy Law’s Self-Executing Mechanisms*, 5 Berk. Bus. L. J. 79, 79 (2008) (conceding that preserving nonbankruptcy entitlements “is of course only a second order goal” and noting that the main goal is efficiency in the face of financial distress); Rasmussen, *supra* note 4 at 55 n. 7 (1992) (criticizing the Creditors’ Bargain theory for overemphasizing the importance of nonbankruptcy entitlements); Scott, *supra* note 11 at 692 (“Nonetheless, it is only partially successful in rationalizing current bankruptcy law.”); see also Moringiello, *supra* note 9 (criticizing the over application of the Butner Principle); Foohey, *supra* note 16 (suggesting the existing focus on efficiency gives too little consideration to issues of procedural justice); Randal C. Picker, *Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors’ Bargain*, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 519, 526 (1992) (noting general skepticism as to the Creditors’ Bargain theory as a positive theory of bankruptcy law).

Even one of the scholars who originally formulated the theory has moved on from its original content. Baird and Rasmussen (2002), *supra* note 1 at 755 (declaring that older model does not matter anymore); Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 652-53 (noting that actual bankruptcy practice is at odds with the Creditors’ Bargain account).

²³ Notably, Professor Dick suggests that while efficiency is the general goal of bankruptcy law and scholarship, the prevailing reliance on neoclassical and other “outmoded” assumptions has doomed the enterprise to failure. Dick, *supra* note 15 at 824.

²⁴ See, for example, Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1565-66 (2013) (referring to the Butner Principle as the “second element” (of two) of the Creditors’ Bargain theory).

system, but they are not successful in stating a unifying theory. The following subsections lay out the usefulness of and limitations of the Creditors' Bargain theory, the Butner Principle, and these other heuristics. But I begin first with a word about collective action.

A. *The Collective Action Problem*

My core claim in this Part is that the Creditors' Bargain theory provides insufficient guidance in deriving a theory of corporate bankruptcy. But conditional upon having a theory (derived from some other source) it does have demonstrative utility.

One obvious candidate for that purpose and limitation is the collective action problem.²⁵ That is certainly where Jackson and Baird looked. Indeed, one push back on my critique might be that the original Creditors' Bargain theory and the Butner Principle are not purpose theories, themselves, but are necessary limitations on a system which has a purpose of solving the collective action problem among creditors.

There is a lot going on in that statement. We can break it into two parts. First, is the purpose definition. If we understand "collective action" to encompass the broad array of ex post bargaining and cooperation problems that arise from hold up associated with financial distress, then I agree and will argue below that bankruptcy is aimed at solving that problem. And I will explain why bankruptcy law should pursue that purpose, and why the problem arises in the first place. That is not, however, the way that bankruptcy scholars define the "collective action problem." The existing literature cabins "collective action" to the narrow problem of general creditors self-interestedly racing to execute their claims on a debtor's assets.²⁶ To this problem, the automatic stay is the most direct response.²⁷

But corporate bankruptcy is much more than that. Financial distress presents a multitude of other coordination and cooperation problems, which bankruptcy law addresses. For

²⁵ Jackson (2018), *supra* note 8 at 1871; Douglas G. Baird, *Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren*, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 827 (1987); Douglas G. Baird and Randal C. Picker, *A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations*, 20 J. Legal Studies 311, 311 (1991) (noting the traditional view that creditors face a collective action problem); Barry E. Adler, *The Creditors' Bargain Revisited*, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1853, 1853-54 (2018) (describing Jackson's bargain theory as one about collective action).

²⁶ See, for example, Baird and Picker, *supra* note 25 at 311-13, 322; Skeel and Triantis, *supra* note 34 at 1817; Adler, *supra* note 25 at 1864.

²⁷ 11 U.S.C. § 362. See below at Part III.A.

example, Professors Baird and Picker explain that distress presents a noncooperative-bargaining problem among senior and junior creditors that is distinct from the “collective action problem.”²⁸ They note that to solve the bargaining problem, “[b]ankruptcy scholarship needs to go beyond examining the collective action problem faced by the residual owners of an insolvent firm.”²⁹ Likewise, Professors Baird and Rasmussen describe bankruptcy’s coordination problem among sophisticated creditors as “quite at odds with the standard account” of the collective action problem.³⁰ More recently, Professor Adler distinguishes free-and-clear sales—which themselves solve a very specific cooperation problem³¹—from anything related to the “collective action problem.”³² Over the last three decades, bankruptcy law and scholarship has, thus, moved far beyond the idea of just solving a race to assets among general creditors.³³

²⁸ Baird and Picker, *supra* note 25 at 311-13, 322.

²⁹ Baird and Picker, *supra* note 25 at 349.

³⁰ Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 653. Professors Skeel and Triantis have similarly concluded that collective action problems “are much less pressing” today and no longer form the central objective of bankruptcy. Skeel and Triantis, *supra* note 34 at 1817.

³¹ Free-and-clear sales solve the hold-up problem that arises when less than all creditors agree to release their claims against a debtor even when doing so would facilitate a value-maximizing sale.

³² Adler, *supra* note 25 at 1864. Professor Schwartz goes even farther claiming that financial distress does not present collective action problems. He argues that bankruptcy law should, therefore, focus exclusively on facilitating liquidity injections from creditors, preventing certain preferential or fraudulent transfers, implementing voting rules for restructuring, and policing auctions for misbehavior. Alan Schwartz, *Bankruptcy Related Contracting and Bankruptcy Functions*, working paper https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2806027 at 57. Oddly, Schwartz does not view any of these functions as addressing a coordination problem. *Id.* at 40 (“[C]oordination among creditors apparently is not a serious problem.”). But all of them involve legal interventions to coordinate multiparty behavior and prevent opportunistic hold-up behavior. Voting rules, for example, are inherently addressed at coordination and unnecessary where coordination is not a problem. The same is true of liquidity measures. See Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1561 and 1576. And preferences and auction misbehavior are forms of hold-up behavior that arise when traditional contracting cannot prevent them. As such all of these functions fit squarely within the structured-renegotiation theory of bankruptcy. Finally, Schwartz does not explain why bankruptcy law should focus on these coordination problems and not others beyond noting the preferences of creditors who lobbied for the 1898 and 1930 bankruptcy laws. *Id.* at 5. The theory I present below suggests that bankruptcy law should address all coordination problems arising from incomplete contracts not just the ones historically favored by creditors.

³³ Douglas G. Baird, Arturo Bris, Ning Zhu, *The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases*, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=866865 at 33 (finding that most corporate bankruptcies do “nothing or close to nothing for ordinary general creditors”).

Today’s bankruptcy debates focus on more complex coordination and negotiation problems.³⁴

Second, the statement above suggests a role for the Creditors’ Bargain and the Butner Principle in setting a limit on a bankruptcy theory. But, for the reasons stated in the next subsection, the Creditors’ Bargain theory and the Butner Principle do not add meaningful limitations to any bankruptcy theory. The Creditors’ Bargain model merely states that bankruptcy’s purpose (whatever it is) should be efficient and the Butner Principle merely states that that purpose should be its own limitation.

B. The Creditors’ Bargain Theory

It is difficult today to separate the Butner Principle from the Creditors’ Bargain. They are often coupled together in bankruptcy law and scholarship, but they are distinct concepts. The Creditors’ Bargain theory is simply a model whereby one “view[s] bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position.”³⁵ The Butner Principle, in its most commonly cited form, provides that bankruptcy law should give special deference to—and avoid interfering with—entitlements and rights that are created by non-bankruptcy law.³⁶

Nothing about the Creditors’ Bargain theory necessitates the Butner Principle. Nor is the Butner Principle helpful in understanding a hypothetical ex ante agreement among creditors. For this reason, I refer to it as the Butner Fallacy. Nonetheless, the Butner Fallacy has repeatedly been justified as a quintessential element of the Creditors’ Bargain.³⁷ Indeed, the first articulation of the Creditors’ Bargain theory was focused almost exclusively on explaining and justifying bankruptcy law’s “substantial respect to non-bankruptcy entitlements.”³⁸

³⁴ See, for example, Kenneth Ayotte, *Disagreement and Capital Structure Complexity*, working paper available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3276779; Dick, *supra* note 15; David A. Skeel, Jr. and George Triantis, *Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm*, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1777, 1781-83 (2018); Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, and David A. Skeel, Jr., *Bankruptcy on the Side*, 112 Nw. L. Rev. 255, 257-58 (2017); Douglas G. Baird, *Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution*, 91 Am. Bank. L. J. 593, 593-95 (2017).

³⁵ Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 at 860.

³⁶ Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 at 907; Baird and Jackson, *supra* note 9 at 100; Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1564-65.

³⁷ See *supra* note 9.

³⁸ Jackson (1982), *supra* note 1 at 859 (citing *Butner v. United States* 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).

But—because they are separate concepts—I will start my discussion by bracketing the Butner Fallacy and exploring the independent model within the Creditors’ Bargain theory looking at its utility and limitations.

i. Demonstrative Utility

The Creditors’ Bargain model is useful in two ways. To start, it helps demonstrate financial concepts and efficiency dynamics. More specifically, the model demonstrates that ex post legal interventions will be priced into and can affect ex ante bargaining. In this way, a creditor who benefits from a legal intervention that redistributes ex post value may actually be worse off if you take a dynamic view across time. For example, the Creditors’ Bargain is often invoked for the following idea: Imagine all creditors bargaining with full information over the rules that will apply in bankruptcy. We can predict that they will first bargain for rules that expand the pie the most and then they will agree on prices and other methods to divide the surplus created by the expansion. As a corollary, we can also predict that if one creditor proposes a rule that will increase her share of the bankruptcy estate, she will be charged an ex ante fee by the other creditors to offset that ex post distribution.³⁹

This is a salient version of a more complicated point: Among sophisticated rational actors, initial investment decisions and prices take into account expectations about ultimate returns. If a legal change reduces the expected payout for a creditor in bankruptcy, that creditor will charge a higher interest rate up front.⁴⁰ But – because *all* creditors take expected returns into account⁴¹ – legal rules that merely alter distribution rules among

³⁹ Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, *The Uneasy Case for Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy*, 105 Yale L. J. 857, 881-82 (1996).

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ Later work criticized this part of the Creditor’s Bargain theory by pointing out that some creditors may not be able to adjust interest rates to account for expected returns. Douglas Baird, *A World without Bankruptcy*, 50 Law and Cont. Prob., 173, 180 (1987) (noting that tort victims cannot adjust interest rates); Bebchuk and Fried, *supra* note 39 at 895-902 (modeling the problems nonadjusting creditors pose for the Creditors’ Bargain theory); Richard Squire, *The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights*, 118 Yale L. J. 806, 808-09 (2009) (showing how value can be extracted from nonadjusting creditors); Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, *Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: and Empirical Intervention*, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1203 (2005). These nonadjusting or maladjusting creditors receive the same interest rate regardless of their expected payouts in bankruptcy. Tort victims are the most obvious group of nonadjusting creditors. Some think employees and small vendors may also belong to this category. Virtually everyone agrees that the problem of nonadjusting creditors requires separate attention—and perhaps separate treatment—in bankruptcy. There is disagreement, however, about the size of the problem in most cases. Compare Warren and Westbrook, *supra* at 1221-22, 1236

creditors without otherwise changing the size of the pie do not affect the firm's value.⁴² The creditor who is favored (in expectation) by a rule that applies in bankruptcy will charge a lower interest rate, the creditor who is disfavored by the rule will charge a higher interest rate, and the debtor will face the same cost of capital.⁴³ No value is lost, and everyone ends up in the same (expected) position. In designing the system, we should, therefore, only care about rules that increase or decrease the size of the pie, not those that change how the parties divide it.

The takeaway is that the only changes that matter are those that create (or eliminate) inefficiencies. Thus, a distribution rule that also distorted the incentives of those running the business *would* matter. For example, a bankruptcy rule that inflates distributions to management could cause managers to inefficiently expend resources in order to cause a bankruptcy filing.⁴⁴ That rule would reduce the value of the firm and constrain its ex ante ability to raise capital.⁴⁵ By focusing our attention on a hypothetical ex ante bargain, the model highlights this important interaction between ex post and ex ante efficiency.

The Creditors' Bargain model can also provide rhetorical justification for the perhaps less-than-intuitive idea that bankruptcy law should interfere with private ordering to achieve its efficiency goal.⁴⁶ The rhetorical move is to tie the efficiency goal to the ideal private order. The law is framed not as interfering with private ordering, but as vindicating the order that creditors would agree to if they privately bargained over it.

There is not much substance there. But the rhetoric is important. The idea is that bankruptcy law provides a set of rules that interfere with private rights but only when those private rights are misfiring. If bankruptcy law does that efficiently, the bargain model points out that the creditors can allocate any benefits achieved by adjusting their ex ante prices. Thus, while bankruptcy law is—at its core—a federal law that intervenes in

(finding the problem to be large), with Robert K. Rasmussen, *Empirically Bankrupt*, Col. Bus. L. Rev. 179 (2007) at 3-6 (questioning Warren and Westbrook's results); see also. Baird, Bris, and Zhu, *supra* note 33 at 33 (finding that most bankruptcy proceedings have little to do with the rights of nonadjusting creditors).

⁴² This all follows from the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, *The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment*, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 268-71 (1958).

⁴³ Id.; Bebchuk and Fried, *supra* note 39 at 881.

⁴⁴ Baird, *supra* note 12 at 592.

⁴⁵ Barry E. Adler, *Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy*, 41 J. L. Stud. 209, 214 (2012).

⁴⁶ This idea is likely less controversial today that it was in the early days of law and economics. But it certainly still has its critics. See Schwartz, *supra* note 4 at 630; Schwartz *supra* note 32 at 56.

state law and private ordering among creditors, the model shows that the benefits of that intervention run to those same creditors.

In this way, the Creditors' Bargain model was useful in explaining why creditors should not object in principle to a paternalistic attempt to solve their coordination problem. But—as I will discuss in the next section—it does not explain why bankruptcy law focuses on solving that particular problem and not others or how it should do so.

ii. Limitations: Purpose and Scope

Despite its demonstrative utility, the Creditors' Bargain model is not a complete theory of bankruptcy. To be complete, a theory of any legal field should present a well-defined and justifiable purpose and a limiting principle to define its scope. The Creditors' Bargain does neither. While it illustrates a generic efficiency argument for maximizing the welfare of stakeholders, the model of an *ex ante* agreement among creditors proves both unnecessary and unhelpful in defining the substance or scope of that welfare-maximizing purpose.

As noted, the model helps to justify government intervention by demonstrating why creditors would prefer a law that is efficient—they prefer to take their slices from a larger pie. But any model starting with rational actors who enter an agreement in a world of perfect information and no transaction costs will arrive inescapably at the solution that maximizes the welfare of those rational actors.⁴⁷ That is a mere nod toward the goal of welfare-maximizing efficiency.⁴⁸

And yet even if we embrace the efficiency purpose as given—which I do in this Article⁴⁹—we still have to answer fundamental questions about whose welfare we are maximizing and within what parameters. For starters, why should bankruptcy law maximize the value of those who have claims against the debtor's

⁴⁷ This is really just the Coase theorem. Without transaction costs, bargaining will lead to the socially efficient outcome. Coase, *supra* note 3 at 15. When transaction costs do exist, the law may need to step in to achieve efficiency. *Id.* at 16-19.

⁴⁸ In the more general law-and-economics context—independent of bankruptcy—others have pointed out that hypothetical-contracts frameworks do not add anything to general ideas of efficiency. Jules Coleman, *RISK AND WRONGS*, at 169 (1992) ([T]here appears to be nothing expressed by the concept of hypothetical consent that is not already captured in the idea of rational self-interest.”).

⁴⁹ Consistent with most law-and-economics approaches, I embrace the idea of maximizing welfare. My primary goal is to propose a workable welfarist theory. I do not here undertake a more fundamental defense of the general law-and-economics welfarist approach.

assets⁵⁰ and not others who are affected by the debtor’s business, or even total outsiders? This question has divided bankruptcy scholars for years.⁵¹ The Creditors’ Bargain avoids the question by assumption—if the purpose is to mirror a creditors’ bargain, then the creditors are the focus.

But why not mirror an ideal bargain between all affected parties? If bankruptcy is intended to solve a bargaining problem among creditors, why shouldn’t it solve other bargaining problems related to a debtor’s distress? If we can imagine a bargain that includes all possible creditors, we can also imagine a bargain that includes employees, consumers, and communities with an interest (or the possibility of an interest) in the long-term success (or failure) of the debtor firm. And that bargain could take into account all of their interests, even those that do not take the form of a claim against assets—a consumer’s interest in cheap goods, a local government’s interest in tax revenue, a stakeholder’s interest in maximizing its other investments in competing firms, any interest affected by any externality of the firm’s actions. As long as we assume transaction costs are zero, we can come to an imagined bargain that includes enough transfer payments to achieve an efficient outcome that maximizes the value of all interests across all conceivable parties.

Unless one intends bankruptcy to implement a theory of general welfare, one needs to define a concrete purpose for the system and then develop a partition to limit the scope of actions taken to achieve that purpose.⁵² One has to define what is—for lack of a better term—bankruptcy stuff and what is not.

The Creditors’ Bargain model fails at drawing a partition as a descriptive and normative matter. Descriptively it gets things wrong.⁵³ It identifies the claims against the estate as bankruptcy stuff under current bankruptcy law when virtually all corporate bankruptcy systems in the world draw the partition more broadly than that.⁵⁴ Normatively, the model never explains why one

⁵⁰ Baird and Jackson use the word “creditors” to encompass all those with claims against the debtor estate. See Jackson (2018), *supra* note 8 at 1872 (“In retrospect, I might have better labeled it as a ‘claimants’ bargain’ or something broader.”).

⁵¹ See for example, Donald Korobkin, *Contractarian and Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law*, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 572-75 (arguing for an approach to the Creditors’ Bargain that includes all affected parties).

⁵² On the importance and challenges in drawing this partition, see Douglas G. Baird, Anthony J. Casey, and Randal C. Picker, *The Bankruptcy Partition*, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1675, 1677 (2018).

⁵³ See sources cited *supra* note 22.

⁵⁴ See Baird, Casey, and Picker, *supra* note 52 at 1684-86 (demonstrating the ways in which bankruptcy power reaches beyond merely resolving claims against the estate). The same is true of corporate insolvency systems around the world. See, for example, Horst

should draw the partition where it does, why the law should focus on the interests of claimants and not the interests of anyone who has a nonclaim interest affected by the debtor. And without an answer to that question, we have no theory. This deficiency of theory manifests itself regularly in debates about whether new disputes—like third-party release—fall within or without bankruptcy’s partition.⁵⁵

No doubt, many readers familiar with the Creditors’ Bargain literature are objecting at this point. Surely, they will say, the Creditors’ Bargain theory does tell us where and why to draw the partition: We must maximize the value not of generic interests in the world but of nonbankruptcy entitlements against the debtor. And we must do so in the way that least interferes with those interests. And the reason for doing so? That brings us to the Butner Fallacy.

C. *The Butner Fallacy*

Lacking a purpose and a limiting principle, the Creditors’ Bargain model spawned a specious scope limitation that is often mistaken for a core purpose. For nearly four decades, the Creditors’ Bargain model—beyond stating the generic efficiency principle—has focused on the question of preserving and protecting substantive rights that exist outside of the bankruptcy system.⁵⁶ The idea takes its name from *Butner v. United States*⁵⁷ (which, incidentally, does not actually require that bankruptcy law provide any special respect for nonbankruptcy substantive rights).⁵⁸

Eidenmueller, Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2799863 (exploring the English, French, German, and American systems systems); Singapore’s Bold New Restructuring Laws Take Effect, <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/06/singapore-restructuring-laws-take-effect>.

⁵⁵ See Baird, Casey, and Picker, *supra* note 52 at 1686-90.

⁵⁶ See *supra* note 9.

⁵⁷ 440 U.S. 48 (1979).

⁵⁸ See *supra* note 8. Far from suggesting that bankruptcy law should not interfere with nonbankruptcy rights, the Court in *Butner* explicitly stated that the Bankruptcy Clause of the constitution granted Congress the authority to alter nonbankruptcy rights:

The constitutional authority of Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United State” would clearly encompass a federal statute defining the mortgagee’s interest in the rents and profits earned by a property in a bankrupt estate.

Id. at 54. It was only because the bankruptcy code was silent on the matter that the Court deferred to state law. This is a familiar interpretive move whereby the Court does not lightly presume that Congress has interfered with or preempted state law.

The assumption that connects the Creditors' Bargain to the Butner Fallacy is that creditors would – if they could – bargain for rules that vindicate their substantive ex ante entitlements. Thus, according to some versions of the Butner Fallacy, ex post bankruptcy laws can only reach matters that preserve those ex ante entitlements.⁵⁹

This is both circular and wrong. It is circular—or at least self-contradicting—because it relies on nonbankruptcy entitlements to tell us when the law should interfere with nonbankruptcy entitlements. We are imagining a bargain where the parties are writing rules for what to do when their nonbankruptcy agreements are misfiring. Then, to limit the scope of those rules, we are told to respect those nonbankruptcy agreements as much as possible. So when should we supplant those nonbankruptcy rights? When doing so will vindicate the nonbankruptcy rights. But, then, which nonbankruptcy rights do we vindicate, and which do we supplant?

The problem in answering these questions is that the corporate bankruptcy system is a system of laws that suspends, eradicates, or otherwise interferes with substantive rights that would exist outside of bankruptcy. This is true of every key provision of the bankruptcy code.⁶⁰ The automatic stay prevents the enforcement of contracts.⁶¹ The cramdown provisions prevent a secured creditor from foreclosing on its collateral.⁶² The sale provisions allow the sale of assets free and clear of interests that would otherwise attach to the assets.⁶³ The contract-assumption provisions allow a debtor to enforce contracts where it would otherwise be in default.⁶⁴

Thus, the Butner Fallacy is a prescription that bankruptcy law should not interfere with non-bankruptcy entitlements unless it should. As Professor Moringiello has pointed out, in this framing the principle has no content.⁶⁵ The idea parses out to an admonition that bankruptcy law controls substantive rights only when it serves a bankruptcy purpose. This does nothing more

⁵⁹ See, for example, Jacoby and Janger (2017), *supra* note 9 at 676 (arguing that bankruptcy law is derived from nonbankruptcy entitlements); Mooney *supra* note 9 at 934 (arguing that bankruptcy law exists to serve nonbankruptcy entitlements).

⁶⁰ And most key provisions of corporate insolvency laws in other countries. See Eidenmueller, *supra* note 54.

⁶¹ 11 U.S.C. § 362.

⁶² 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

⁶³ 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).

⁶⁴ 11 U.S.C. § 365.

⁶⁵ Moringiello, *supra* note 9 at 659.

than highlight the idea that bankruptcy law should have a purpose.

D. The Creditors' Bargain and the Butner Fallacy as Distractions

i. The False Promise of “Real-World” Agreements

A common move among judges, scholars, and lawyers is to justify (or refute) bankruptcy outcomes by pointing to evidence of real-world agreements that match (or contradict) the proposed outcome.⁶⁶ They suggest that if we cannot see creditors in the real world adopting such rules, then we cannot satisfy the Creditors' Bargain model.⁶⁷ How, they ask, can you say parties would bargain for something when we see them bargaining for the opposite?

This misses the point. If you believe the Creditors' Bargain theory, we only see parties bargaining in a world where we have already stipulated that they cannot bargain efficiently to their desired outcome, and we only see them bargaining in the shadow of a mandatory bankruptcy system that forces a hypothetical bargain on them to protect them from their own bad bargain.⁶⁸ That tells us little about what they would choose if they were rationally designing a system in a perfect world.

We want to know the efficient rule or—if one must frame it in bargaining terms—the rule that would have resulted from a pristine bargain that exists nowhere in the world. The fact that creditors in the real world act strategically and possess incomplete and asymmetric information should surprise no one. Their actual agreements and their stated preferences are, therefore, poor evidence of the rules that we should adopt to fix contracting failures among them.

ii. Trying to Solve the Wrong Problem

The Creditors' Bargain theory also misleads because it entices scholars to think that we can solve bankruptcy's problems by

⁶⁶ See, for example, Barry A. Adler and George Triantis, *Debt Priority and Options in Bankruptcy: A Policy Intervention*, 91 Am. Bankr. L. J. 563, 583 (2017) (deriving bankruptcy option value from the terms of loan agreements); see also Jacoby and Janger (2017), *supra* note 9 at 676 (deriving optimal bankruptcy rules from nonbankruptcy rights); Jacoby and Janger (2014), *supra* note 9 at 892 (same); *In re MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive)*, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014).

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 584 (looking to “real world” debt contracts as evidence of optimal bankruptcy rules); Schwartz, *supra* note 32 at 4 and 55 (building an analysis on the motivations of creditors).

⁶⁸ Anthony J. Casey and Edward R. Morrison, *Beyond Options*, working paper available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855954 at 6.

facilitating communication in order to make an explicit ex ante bargain possible. For example, some have proposed that we could solve the bargaining problem by helping debtors adopt custom-made bankruptcy rules that are transparent to counterparties and affected parties.⁶⁹ This transparency would allow the law to infer contractual assent much like it does with mortgages and security interests. But the real problem lies beyond the creditors' logistical ability to bargain with each other. As recent scholarship has pointed out, even small numbers of creditors in an explicit bargain will write incomplete contracts that produce inefficient results when financial distress arises.⁷⁰

The real problem stems from uncertainty and complexity about the distressed state of the world. By its very nature, financial distress is hard to contract over. The time horizon, the number of parties, and the number of contingencies render the possible scenarios too numerous to define and negotiate.⁷¹ Moreover, the dynamic nature of markets in distress require flexibility that would be stifled by hard-edged ex ante rules.⁷²

As discussed below, this presents an incomplete contracting problem to which bankruptcy law responds.⁷³ Because this is an incomplete contracting problem, it cannot be solved by facilitating private contracts. Any contract or legislation addressing the substance of the financial distress problem will, itself, be incomplete and require courts to fill in gaps in response to uncertainty. This problem, therefore, is not corrected by

⁶⁹ See Adler and Kahan, *supra* note 4 at 1794-1809; Rasmussen, *supra* note 4 at 100-11 (1992); Skeel, *supra* note 4 at 525; see also Barry E. Adler, *Financial and Political Theories of American Bankruptcy*, 45 *Stan. L. Rev.* 311, 322-23 (1993) (examining investor choice proposals); see also Alan Schwartz, *A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy*, 107 *Yale L. J.* 1807 (1998) (arguing generally for rules that facilitate private contracting); Skeel and Triantis, *supra* note 34 at 1817 (urging bankruptcy law to take ex ante contracting more seriously).

⁷⁰ Professor Ayotte's work is the most groundbreaking on this issue. See Kenneth Ayotte, *On the Mandatory Stay of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy*, working paper available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3060748; Ayotte, *supra* note 34; Ayotte, Casey, and Skeel, *supra* note 34.

⁷¹ See Jackson and Scott, *supra* note 10 at 166 (“[T]he creditors' bargain of necessity involves long-term relationships in which many of the contingencies that influence business prospects are uncertain and highly interactive.”); see also Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 652 (“In short, the new world of corporate reorganizations has more heterogeneous creditors whose rights against the business are deeply fragmented.”).

⁷² The same can be said about attempts to regulate bailouts and other government action in times of systemic financial distress. See Anthony J. Casey and Eric A. Posner, *A Framework for Bailout Regulation*, 91 *Notre Dame L. Rev.* 479, 536 (2015); see also Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, *Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure*, 92 *Tex. L. Rev.* 75 (2013); Jeffrey Manns, *Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach*, 63 *Fla. L. Rev.* 1349 (2011).

⁷³ See below at Part II.A-B.

facilitating ex ante bargains or by adopting technology that allows disperse creditors to express assent to a specific substantive bankruptcy regime.

E. Other Incomplete Heuristics

Over the years, the academy has produced other heuristics to explain or supplement the Creditors' Bargain theory.

The most prominent is the Sole Owner Principle.⁷⁴ Like the hypothetical bargain, this is another way of demonstrating the importance of efficiency. If we imagine a rational sole owner making decisions—instead of a group of creditors costlessly bargaining—we again arrive inevitably at the efficient outcome that maximizes the value of all interests that we imagine that person to own. Rational owners maximize the value of the things they own.

But this raises, once again, the thorny question of scope: Sole owner of what? The legal entity? The economic enterprise? All stakes? All interests? The community and market as a whole?

Moreover, the question in bankruptcy is how to solve a coordination problem that arises with hold-up threats in distress.⁷⁵ A single owner won't incur any coordination problems. It makes little sense, then, to ask what a single owner would do to coordinate with her co-owners. You cannot solve a problem of coordinating incentives by assuming a single owner.

One might instead ask what substantive rule the single owner would follow. But if we are writing the law in the face of uncertainty about financial distress, we cannot specify that substantive rule ex ante.⁷⁶ Instead, we need procedural rules that will move the parties' ex post decisions toward the correct substantive choice—which the court cannot verify.⁷⁷ No single owner would bother considering the content of such procedural rules.

Another popular heuristic is the rule of general averages.⁷⁸ This heuristic is sometimes used to expand or enhance the Creditors' Bargain model by explaining why the creditors might agree to share risk when distress arrives.⁷⁹ Comparing the

⁷⁴ See Jackson, *supra* note 9 at 12; Skeel and Triantis, *supra* note 34 at 1778; Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1563; Baird, *supra* note 12 at 582; Baird and Jackson, *supra* note 9 at 121.

⁷⁵ See below at Part II.A.

⁷⁶ See below at Part II.A.ii.

⁷⁷ See below at Part II.A-B.

⁷⁸ Scott, *supra* note 11 at 692; Jackson and Scott, *supra* note 10 at 189-90, 199, 202.

⁷⁹ Jackson and Scott, *supra* note 10 at 156-57.

bankrupt debtor to a ship foundering at sea, the idea is that bankruptcy might follow admiralty's rule that all stakeholders "contribute thereafter to the general average expense according to their percentage of ownership."⁸⁰

This adds two aspects to the Creditors' Bargain. First, it introduces the important idea of uncertainty. And second, it introduces agency costs. Because the captain of a foundering ship will be making decisions in an uncertain environment, the best the law can do is align incentives to "dissipate the captain's conflict between self-interest and duty at the moment of sacrifice."⁸¹ So too might the law of bankruptcy create rules to dissipate the debtor's conflict.

This framing generally represents the bankruptcy problem. Faced with uncertainty, the law wants to give ex post actors the right incentives. But no one has shown that general average contribution is the best way to do that.⁸² Nor is general average contribution a common method deployed as a solution by actual bankruptcy laws.⁸³

Doubtless there are other analogies that one could draw. Indeed, any comparison to an area of the law that deals with ex ante regulation of ex post discretion is likely to provide a generic description of the bankruptcy problem.⁸⁴ The key is to move from these generic heuristics and analogies to a fuller theory describing the specific problems and solutions as they actually arise in corporate bankruptcy.

II. Discovering the Structured-Renegotiation Theory of Corporate Bankruptcy

A law-and-economics theory of bankruptcy should define an efficiency goal that is directed at a "bankruptcy" problem. The structured-renegotiation theory provides that bankruptcy law's purpose is to minimize the value destroyed by the incomplete contracting problem that parties face with regard to financial distress. It does so, if imperfectly, by facilitating a structured

⁸⁰ Jackson and Scott, *supra* note 10 at 171 (citing Grant C. Gilmore & Charles L. Black, *THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY* 244 (2d ed. 1975)).

⁸¹ Scott, *supra* note 11 at 702.

⁸² Below I argue that it is not a good way to accomplish the goal. See below at ___.

⁸³ See below Part II.B-C.

⁸⁴ Bailout literature comes first to mind. See sources cited *supra* note 72. Analogies to the Alaska Packers case and duress would also work. *Alaska Packer Ass'n v. Domenico*, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Professor Buccola has recently suggested a similar analogy between bankruptcy and tort law's private necessity doctrine from *Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.* 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).

bargaining space where the relevant parties renegotiate their relationship. That bargaining space constrains the parties procedurally and substantively in ways that are targeted at minimizing their ability and incentive to hold each other up by deviating from the welfare maximizing course of action.

The reason an entire field of law exists to address this problem—rather than the application of something like routine contract law—is the ubiquity of the problem. An overwhelming majority of business relationships suffer from the same incomplete contracting problem when financial distress arises.⁸⁵ As a result, a system of uniform procedures has arisen to deal with the value destruction associated with that problem. Indeed, if one imagines a world without bankruptcy law⁸⁶ or observes financial markets that exist in jurisdictions without a functioning bankruptcy system, it is not surprising that the incomplete contracting problem would produce pressures requiring a judicial or legislative solution.⁸⁷

Recognizing the source of the problem also sheds light on the two scope parameters for a proper bankruptcy system. First, bankruptcy law is targeted specifically at solving hold-up problems related to the incomplete contracting problem that arises with financial distress. This means that bankruptcy law

⁸⁵ Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 698; Jackson and Scott, *supra* note 10 at 166.

⁸⁶ See Baird, *supra* note 41 at 184 (imagining such a world and noting that creditors would self-interestedly destroy value).

⁸⁷ For example, India only recently adopted a unified corporate insolvency system. The demands for reform leading to its adoption were in response to problems that fit the hold-up model presented in this paper. Kristin Van Zwieten, *Corporate Rescue In India: The Influence of the Courts*, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466329 (2014) (describing two decades of sustained calls for reform); Rajeswari Sengupta, Anjali Sharma, and Susan Thomas, *Evolution of the Insolvency Framework for non-financial Firms in India*, available at <http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2016-018.pdf> (describing stalled development of financial markets as a result of “the absence of a coherent and effective mechanism for resolving insolvency”); Nimrit Kang and Nitin Nayar, *The Evolution of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in India*, ICRA Bulletin on Money and Finance (2003-2004) (noting the need for reform in the absence of a “single and integrated policy on corporate bankruptcy”). Calls for insolvency reform in France and the Czech Republic present similar themes. See, for example, Sophie Vermeille, *How French Bankruptcy Law has Failed to Adapt to the Evolution of the Economy and Finance*, available at <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/how-french-bankruptcy-law-has-failed-adapt-evolution-economy-and-finance> (“French law has never perceived bankruptcy law as an extension of the negotiations of the parties.”); Jeffrey A. McGehee, *Insolvency Law Reform in the Czech Republic – A Timely Opportunity that Hopefully Will not be Wasted* available at <https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/en/insights/publications/2004/11/insolvency-law-reform-in-the-czech-republic--a-t> (2004) (“It is an unfortunate and widely recognized reality that existing Czech insolvency law is an inadequate solution for financially distressed business enterprises.”).

will be worried about ex post behavior that opportunistically uses incompleteness to extract value. Parties are vulnerable to hold up when they have made relationship-specific investments.⁸⁸ Thus, bankruptcy measures will properly target actions involving and affecting investments specific to relationships that involve or link in some way to the debtor. Attempts to fix other problems, while potentially valid, are not “bankruptcy” measures.⁸⁹

Second, because the purpose of bankruptcy law is to efficiently solve an incomplete contracting problem, it should reject any solution that introduces worse hold-up problems than it solves or that destroys more value than it creates or preserves.

In this Part, I explore these theoretical points in detail. First, I present the incomplete contracting problem that bankruptcy law is solving. Second, I describe the structured bargaining space and procedures for renegotiation that the bankruptcy system implements to solve that problem. Third, I explore how this system balances ex ante and ex post concerns. Finally, I discuss how the theory informs the proper scope of bankruptcy law.

A. Bankruptcy’s Incomplete Contract

i. The Problem of Financial Distress

Financial distress is common. But its contours and causes are difficult to predict with any reasonable degree of certainty.

Generally, financial distress exists when a firm cannot finance new projects that have net positive value.⁹⁰ Because investors should be eager to fund profitable endeavors, financial distress implies a market imperfection and the opportunity for successful legal intervention. The usual suspects for this imperfection are debt overhang, asymmetric information, and illiquid capital markets.⁹¹

Debt overhang arises when existing contracts get in the way of new financing.⁹² A firm cannot raise new money for valuable

⁸⁸ Hart and Moore, *supra* note 5 at 757; Steven Shavell, *The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach*, 99 Q. J. Econ. 121, 123 (1984); Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver Hart, *The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration*, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 695-97 (1986); Patrick W. Schmitz, *The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory*, 53 Bull. Econ. Res. 1, 15(2001).

⁸⁹ As many have recognized, using bankruptcy law to address nonbankruptcy problems can obscure both proper bankruptcy policies and the proper nonbankruptcy solutions to those problems. See, for example, Baird, *supra* note 12 at 592.

⁹⁰ Barry E. Adler, Douglas G. Baird, and Thomas H. Jackson, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY, 4TH ED. (2007) 26-29.

⁹¹ See Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 (describing these three phenomena).

⁹² See Stewart C. Myers, *Determinants of Corporate Borrowing*, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 147, 149 (1977); Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1570-71 (explaining debt overhang); Adler

projects because the future revenues from those projects are already claimed by existing creditors. In a world of perfect ex post bargaining, this problem goes away. The debtor renegotiates its old relationships to allow new investments to take priority. The new projects increase the value of the firm and everyone is better off.⁹³ The various parties with an interest in the debtor reach a Coasean bargain to coordinate their behavior, expand the pie, and split the surplus.⁹⁴ Thus, debt overhang is only a problem because ex post bargaining is not perfect and the relevant parties cannot coordinate to renegotiate the network of their relationships.

Asymmetric information and illiquid capital markets present a slightly different problem. Here, the debtor cannot convince the market to provide capital for valuable new projects—either because it cannot convince investors that it has good projects and is a good credit risk,⁹⁵ or because capital and credit markets are generally frozen.⁹⁶ Again, if bargaining is costless, the relevant parties will negotiate solutions to these problems. For example, insiders with full information could agree to self-finance the firm’s future projects.⁹⁷ Similarly, the interested parties might agree to sell the firm to one of the insiders.⁹⁸ Again, the only obstacles to an ex post agreement are the bargaining dynamics that get in the way of efficient renegotiation.

ii. The Incompleteness of Contractual Responses

The claim of this Article is that the American bankruptcy system ultimately provides bargaining parameters that move the

and Triantis, *supra* note 67 at 579 (providing an example to illustrate the debt overhang problem).

⁹³ See Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1576.

⁹⁴ Without bargaining costs, the parties can always bargain to achieve this mutually beneficial outcome. See Coase, *supra* note 3 at 2-15.

⁹⁵ See Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1579-85.

⁹⁶ This was the case, for example, during part of the Great Financial Crisis. Markus K. Brunnermeier, *Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008*, 23 J. Econ. Persp. 77, 91-92 (2009) (explaining the causes of liquidity dry-ups).

⁹⁷ This assumes they have access to the necessary funds, which is likely true with banks that are prepetition lenders. Indeed, prepetition bank lenders very often provide financing for chapter 11 reorganizations. Sandeep Dahiya, Kose John, Manju Puri, Gabriel Ramirez, *Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence*, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 259, 265 (2003) (finding 58% of loans in a sample were provided by prepetition lenders).

⁹⁸ Or they might agree to other solutions aimed at creating liquidity, like allowing the debtor to access cash or other assets belonging to its affiliates. For an example of this measure being facilitated by a court order rather than by negotiation, see *In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc.*, 409 B.R. 43, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (where the court allowed the debtor to upstream cash from subsidiaries to the parent company to provide liquidity to affiliate entities).

parties—somewhat coercively—toward these ex post bargains.⁹⁹ An alternative system—the one envisioned by contractarians and Creditors’ Bargain theorists—might use ex ante rules in a contract or in legislation to strictly bind the relevant parties to take certain actions when financial distress arises. For example, creditors could agree to a defined trigger that automatically converts their claims to equity in order to eliminate debt overhang,¹⁰⁰ or they could agree to a trigger that creates an automatic commitment for certain creditors to provide a new loan.¹⁰¹

The difficulty for those mechanisms lies in the ex ante choice and definition of the precise remedial measures and the contingencies that will trigger them. The preceding subsection described distress generally, but every firm is distressed in its own way. Overhang and illiquidity might be caused by failed expansion, a cyclical downturn, technological change, a systemic liquidity shock, a supply shock, a demand shock, new competition, bad management, asymmetric information, or any combination of these or the many other possible causes of distress.

Moreover, the state of affairs when distress hits can take many forms. The creditors may include banks, vendors, hedge funds, or tort victims. They may be secured or unsecured. They may include many layers of priority or few. They may be dispersed or consolidated. They may include employees and competitors. They may have bought or sold claims to or from other claimants.¹⁰² They may have conflicting investments.¹⁰³ They may hold hedged positions or complex financial derivatives like credit

⁹⁹ For example, reorganization plans facilitated by chapter 11 (11 U.S.C. § 1121-29) globally restructure relationships; debtor-in-possession financing (11 U.S.C. § 364) and cramdown (11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)) coerce bargains to self-finance; various forms of partial consolidation across entities allow for affiliate financing (see, for example, *In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc.*, 409 B.R. at 61); and free-and-clear sales (11 U.S.C. § 363(f)) often result in sales to insiders.

¹⁰⁰ Professor Adler pioneered this idea. See Adler, *supra* note 69 at 312.

¹⁰¹ See Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1594 (exploring the idea of coerced loan commitments).

¹⁰² Victoria Ivashina, Benjamin Iverson, and David C. Smith, *The Ownership and Trading of Debt Claims in Chapter 11 Restructurings*, 119 J. Fin. Econ. 316 (2015); Jared Elias, *Bankruptcy Claims Trading*, 15 J. Emp. Legal Studies 772, 795 (2018) (noting that claims trading is a pervasive feature of chapter 11); Edith Hotchkiss and Robert Mooradian, *Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms*, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1883 at 4; Anthony J. Casey, *Auction Design for Claims Trading*, 22 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 133, 133-34 (2014).

¹⁰³ See, for example, *DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc.*, 634 F.3d 79, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (designating the vote of a creditor that also held significant investment in a direct competitor of the debtor).

default swaps.¹⁰⁴ They may need cash immediately or they may be reluctant to cash out their interests for regulatory reasons.¹⁰⁵ They may be parties to agreements with other creditors that dictate their actions when distress arises.¹⁰⁶

Finally, different constituencies may have invested deeply in the relationships that need to be renegotiated in bankruptcy. The debtor may face financial concerns, regulatory pressures, union negotiations, community pressures, or a declining customer base. Each of these problems implicates a different set of relationships as the subject for renegotiation.

In times of distress, the proper response for each party in these relationships turns on the specific characteristics of the entire constellation of interests. The best way to choose between and implement a reorganization, going-concern sale, or liquidation, will turn on the state of the market, the causes of distress, and the relationships that exist between the parties. The specific causes of distress will impact the willingness and ability of outsiders to provide new capital and of insiders to take a haircut or forbear on enforcing claims.¹⁰⁷ The specific agreements and relationships that exist at the time of distress will affect their ability and incentives to coordinate behavior.¹⁰⁸ And so on.

If we imagine claimants bargaining *ex ante*, they will face an insurmountable challenge in any attempt to write contingent substantive rules for every distress situation.¹⁰⁹ The same will be true of any attempt to write those rules into legislation. This is why the Creditors' Bargain model and the proposed solutions in its wake fall short.¹¹⁰ Any legislative attempt to write a complete

¹⁰⁴ Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 678-86.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, *In re RTJJ, Inc.*, No. 11-32050, 2013 WL 462003, at *15 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2013) ("Under pressure from federal regulators, Community One seeks to rid itself of this nonperforming loan, at any cost. Its aims are noneconomic—at least as to this Debtor—and are destructive.").

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, *In re RadioShack Corp.*, 550 B.R. 700, 703-05 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (noting a dispute arising out of a web intercreditor agreements that dictated the relationships between multiple creditors).

¹⁰⁷ For example, a cyclical downturn in the industry will limit investment from industry players and any sale to a strategic buyer. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, *Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach*, 47 J. Fin. 1343, 1344-45 (1992).

¹⁰⁸ Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 687.

¹⁰⁹ Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 at 698 ("the agreements will be incomplete and some recourse to gap-filling is necessary").

¹¹⁰ This weakness in hypothetical bargaining solutions has been recognized for decades in the more general context of incomplete contracts. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, *Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules*, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 733 n. 17 (1992) (noting calls to move away from "hypothetical contract" approaches and "a growing consensus among contract scholars that default rules should not simply be the hypothetical contract that parties would choose in a world without

contract for the creditors will fail.¹¹¹ And any mechanism aimed at bringing the creditors together to write a complete contract will also fail. If, for example, every debtor could opt into its own customized set of bankruptcy rules and we could facilitate the assent of all current and future creditors, those rules would still be incomplete when distress arrives.

iii. The Resulting Hold-Up Problem

Incomplete contracts allow parties to evade the spirit of their initial agreements or take advantage of unforeseen contingencies to extract value from each other.¹¹² This is the classic hold-up problem.¹¹³

Stated informally, one party can threaten ex post action that will destroy value in a contractual relationship.¹¹⁴ To demonstrate the idea, imagine a contract between A and B. If a certain contingency arises, A can take action Y that will destroy value in the relationship. The contract between them is incomplete and it does not prohibit such action. Party A might then threaten to take action Y unless B pays a ransom. Imagine also that B has expended resources that are only valuable if her relationship with A continues. Having made these relationship-specific investments, B is willing to pay the ransom to A in order to preserve the relationship. Party A is using the incompleteness—which allows the threat—to extract a hold-up payment.¹¹⁵

The threat of this ex post hold up, in turn, distorts the parties' ex ante interaction.¹¹⁶ Fearing hold up, they either do not enter into the relationship at all or they limit their relationship-specific investment in it over time.¹¹⁷

iv. The Need for a Bankruptcy-Specific Solution

transaction costs"); see also David Charny, *Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation*, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1815 (1991) (noting that the hypothetical-contract framework is often "incorrect, perhaps even incoherent").

¹¹¹ Ayres and Gertner, *supra* note 110 at 733 ("When the parties have asymmetric information, however, the hypothetical contract standard fails to provide an effective framework for choosing efficient rules.").

¹¹² Hart, *supra* note 19 at 1733.

¹¹³ Id.

¹¹⁴ Id.

¹¹⁵ Id.

¹¹⁶ Id at 1741.

¹¹⁷ Id.; Hart and Moore, *supra* note 5. Grossman and Hart, *supra* note 88.

Incomplete contracts are not a unique bankruptcy problem. Many contracts (and most legislation) are incomplete and raise some questions about how to fill their gaps.¹¹⁸

The law might, then, treat incomplete contracts in financial distress the same as any other incomplete contract. That entails a mixture of judicial gap filling¹¹⁹ and enforcing terms as written. This is an imperfect response. When judges do not intervene, the gaps will remain.¹²⁰ And even when judges do intervene, they will fill gaps imperfectly and may be unable to verify the information necessary to enforce a contract.¹²¹

Similarly, lawmakers might write a law that approximates the ideal hypothetical *incomplete* contract and let courts enforce that. That contract would probably be short and say something like, “The parties must behave reasonably in favor of efficiency when distress arises.”¹²²

Either approach would rely on the courts to fill the substantive gaps and would likely lead to different prescriptive outcomes from those advocated by the conventional law-and-economics theories of corporate bankruptcy.¹²³

Bankruptcy law does not take these approaches. There are at least two reasons for this. First, courts would be particularly bad at filling substantive gaps in times of financial distress. Courts are not expert at strategic business planning or financial structuring—especially not within an emergency timeframe. Not only does financial distress pose uncertainty, it does so in a context that requires decisions to be made fast. Firms in financial distress are often bleeding cash and their viability disappears

¹¹⁸ Ayres and Gertner, *supra* note 110 at 730-32 (describing how contracts are incomplete and require gap filling and reviewing scholarship on the problem); Kaplow, *supra* note 5 at 563 (describing the incompleteness problem for legislation).

¹¹⁹ Gap filling here can refer to a court directly filling in a term that is missing in a contract or rewriting a term that is at odds with and does not fully realize the parties’ interests. Ayres and Gertner, *supra* note 110 at 730-31 (noting that courts fill gaps both for “obligationally incomplete” and for “insufficiently state contingent” contracts).

¹²⁰ Parties may try to create private solutions. Scholars have suggested some private ordering measures to reduce hold-up problems associated with incomplete contracts. See, for example, Grossman and Hart, *supra* note 88; Hart and Moore, *supra* note 5. But most of those are not available in the corporate bankruptcy context. It is not feasible, for example, for a firm to integrate with all of its claimants.

¹²¹ Ayres and Gertner, *supra* note 110 at 733 (noting the difficulty for courts to fill gaps).

¹²² As an aside, it is interesting that the Creditors’ Bargain literature rarely talks about whether the hypothetical contract is complete or incomplete, rule-based or standard-based, or whether it assumes perfect information of the bargainers.

¹²³ For example, criticisms of ex post judicial discretion interfering with ex ante contracting would be less powerful in cases like *General Growth* and *RadioShack*. See discussion below at Part II.C.

quickly.¹²⁴ To be sure, the idea that a debtor business is a melting ice cube and that any delay threatens its viability is overplayed in bankruptcy courts.¹²⁵ Lawyers will argue that they must decide in a matter of days. The reality is more like weeks or months. But the *years* that courts often take to fill substantive gaps in other cases are not available in a corporate reorganization.

Second, this problem is ubiquitous. The majority of firms that enter financial distress face major incomplete contracting problems. Of course, if the firm has totally failed and has no going concern value, it can be liquidated easily. And if it is so far gone that only the senior creditor will recover anything, there may be no renegotiation with which to bother. But many firms that go into chapter 11 reorganization are navigating questions of how to preserve value in the face of claims by multiple parties with different interests in the firm's survival.¹²⁶ Those parties naturally have different views and different incentives for how to achieve the best reorganization outcome. This state of affairs poses complicated questions of valuation, control, and vision to which their contracts provide incomplete answers.

The ubiquity of the problem begs for a standardized solution. Given a class of relationships that routinely raise an incomplete contracting problem that the courts are bad at solving substantively, it makes sense to adopt a uniform procedural solution that reduces hold up and increases predictability. If courts will inevitably be involved when distress arises, the law can add value by providing a procedural framework for that involvement. There is little risk of market distortion in legislating a court-supervised procedure over a set of relationships that will require deep judicial intervention either way. Indeed, the law can reduce distortions if it adds predictability and avoids errors. If courts are error prone in substantive gap filling, bankruptcy law can prescribe mechanisms that constrain substantive gap filling as much as possible. Moreover, resting that system in one central (federal) court increases predictability and reduces forum shopping that would otherwise result.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ See Jacoby and Janger, *supra* note 9 at 865 (noting that “[f]inancially distressed companies can melt like ice cubes”).

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 865-676 (noting the prevalence and overuse of the melting ice cube argument); Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, *Bankruptcy Fire Sales*, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 30-31 (2007) (same).

¹²⁶ Baird and Rasmussen (2010), *supra* note 1 651-53.

¹²⁷ One must not, however, be too optimistic. Forum shopping is reduced, but it is surely not eliminated by moving cases into the federal system. Parties can still use variations in the way different federal bankruptcy courts apply the law to extract value

Looking beyond the United States adds support to this story. As financial markets around the world develop faster than local insolvency law, incomplete contracting problems produce pressures that demand solutions of the sort described in this Article. Some jurisdictions allow those pressures to build, only to see dysfunction and hold up grow along with varied calls for reform.¹²⁸ In a financial system without a functioning insolvency law, the bankruptcy state of nature is likely to take one of two extreme forms. Either creditors are left free to enforce contract terms harshly and formalistically¹²⁹ or courts ignore contracts all together and focus on ex post rescue measures without regard to the distortions those measures might create.¹³⁰ Both options allow for hold up, either by the creditors or by equity and management.

A contractarian might object that the relevant parties should be free to choose their own contract terms, even if those terms are vague and incomplete. The question still remains, however, as to how a court should deal with the gaps and unintended consequences in those agreements. The bankruptcy code has emerged as a procedural framework for doing precisely that. It is likely that most parties would prefer such a system because it provides more predictability and less hold-up opportunity than the bankruptcy state of nature which provides no uniform guidance to or constraint on those filling the gaps. But even if the parties do not prefer a standard uniform system of bankruptcy law, once they enter an into incomplete contracts it is consistent with an efficiency principle to funnel their disputes through a uniform system to avoid externalities, market inefficiencies, and the waste of judicial resources that would otherwise occur.

* * *

In sum, bankruptcy law has developed a unique solution to the hold-up problem created by incomplete contracting associated

from each other. See Laura Napoli Coordes, *The Geography of Bankruptcy*, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 381, 384-87 (2015).

¹²⁸ See sources cited *supra* note 87.

¹²⁹ There are historical examples of this. Elena Cirmizi, Leora Klapper, and Mahesh Uttamchandani, *The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform*, 27 The World Bank Res. Observer, 185, 189-90 (2012) (noting that harsh pro-creditor formalism in nineteenth century France and Italy resulted in lower returns for creditors).

¹³⁰ This is the more likely dysfunction today. For example, Professor Van Zwieten chronicles the Indian story where judges' ex post "pro-revival" interventions—"motivated by broader concerns, including the desire to strengthen the industrial sector in newly independent India, and an anxiety to protect workers of sick industrial companies from unemployment"—led to delay, inefficiency, dysfunction and ultimately the need for reform. Van Zwieten, *supra* note 87 at 8-9.

with financial distress.¹³¹ Rather than allow each court to interpret the gaps or simply let the parties live with their incomplete contracts, the system imposes a procedural mechanism that provides space and some freedom for the parties to renegotiate their relationships. That system constrains the parties through procedural oversight and substantive outer limits. That oversight and those limits reduce hold up—although not completely. Some opportunities for strategic behavior may persist, but—when the system works properly—they are significantly dampened. We turn now to the specific characteristics of the system.

B. The Structured Renegotiation

Bankruptcy law treats the relationship between those who have an interest in a financially distressed debtor as governed by an incomplete contract. Where there is little reason to suspect that terms will misfire—because the parties had full ex ante information or because the efficient outcome is not affected by contingencies—the law takes those terms as they are and enforces them. Where the terms might be expected to misfire, the law implements the structured-renegotiation framework. Rather than fill the gaps with specific substantive provisions, the code implements a set of parameters to encourage renegotiation and limit the parties’ incentives and opportunities to engage in hold up.

In some sense, the system is filling in the gaps in these contracts, but instead of having a judge do it, the parties negotiate the gap-filling terms applicable in distress under the court’s oversight and within the law’s parameters.¹³² The law rules out

¹³¹ Some relationships that relate to financial distress do not fall under the power of the bankruptcy court—although the theory in this Article suggests that they should. The ways that those relationships play out provide powerful examples of the incomplete contracting problem and the potential value of the bankruptcy solution. For example, the credit default swaps market is full of examples of ex post hold up. See, for example, Matt Levine, *Direct Listings Are a Thing Now, Also Bathroom Meetings, Sears CDS and Bank Culture*, available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-11/direct-listings-are-a-thing-now> (January 11, 2019) (noting the ex post manipulation of bond prices that are used in calculating CDS payouts related to the Sears bankruptcy and explaining the difficulty in writing a better ex ante contract); Matt Levine, *RadioShack Is Running on Credit Derivatives*, available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-12-18/radioshack-is-running-on-credit-derivatives> (Dec. 18, 2014) (same for RadioShack); see also Andrew Verstein, *Benchmark Manipulation*, 56 *Bost. Col. L. Rev.* 215 (2015) (exploring ex post benchmark manipulation generally).

¹³² Professors Skeel and Triantis make note of the role of rules and standards and renegotiation in bankruptcy theory, but they place more trust in ex ante contracting than the bankruptcy system does. This might be the strongest normative critique of the

terms that are either clearly inefficient (though that sort of clarity is rare) or are very likely to lead to hold up. And for close terms, it requires the parties to subject their renegotiation maneuvers to procedural scrutiny and valuation to limit the possibility of hold up (this is where most of bankruptcy law happens).

In taking this approach, the law accepts that the court cannot know precisely if ex post interventions are efficient.¹³³ As noted throughout this Article, the idea of what is efficient and inefficient is dynamic. Bankruptcy law takes into account the possibility that rules in bankruptcy will have costs outside of bankruptcy. The key is to measure the benefits of a bankruptcy mechanism against the costs it creates outside of bankruptcy by distorting behavior. Because it is difficult for anyone—and especially courts—to measure these costs and benefits exactly, the law implements a proxy system with bargaining and price mechanisms where parties must either present extreme evidence to support a bankruptcy intervention or pay an estimate of a market price in exchange for invoking the intervention.

More specifically, bankruptcy law sets certain default rules and then gives different parties power to alter these rules, but it subjects that power to market prices and evidentiary burdens to show good faith or efficiency. The default rule is set against the party who is most likely to attempt hold up in distress under the original incomplete contracts. Then, in turn, the power to alter that default rule is granted to the other party, against whom the default rule is likely to be invoked to extract value. But any time the bankruptcy law gives someone a decision power it subjects the decision to a pricing system or evidentiary obligation. Sometimes the party altering the rule must pay a price or meet a burden to do so. Other times the other party must pay to negate an altering rule and maintain the default. The allocation of payment

bankruptcy system this Article describes: Bankruptcy law makes the wrong empirical assessment about the difficulty in ex ante contracting and the ability to constrain ex post contracting. Skeel and Triantis, *supra* note 34 at 1816. I am more optimistic that our bankruptcy system usually gets it right. But this empirical question is difficult to answer. Comparing the experiences in markets in other jurisdictions around the world might begin to provide some guidance.

¹³³ Various scholars have recognized this problem. Adler and Triantis, *supra* note 67 at 582; Skeel and Triantis, *supra* note 34 at 1783, 1816; Ayotte and Skeel, *supra* note 9 at 1557; Anthony J. Casey and Edward R. Morrison, *Beyond Options*, working paper available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855954; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal Picker, *Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital*, at 2-4 (1993) available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=law_and_economics (noting the importance of measuring the ex ante effects of ex post interventions).

obligations and burdens and the precise nature of the altering rules are determined based on the relative likelihoods regarding the sources of hold up. Once the court sets these prices and evidentiary burdens, the parties then renegotiate their relationship under the supervision of the court.

We can think of this regime as “cramdown for everything” because its functioning is most clear in the cramdown provisions of the bankruptcy code.¹³⁴ Foreclosure rights are ripe for hold up because the parties cannot contract over all of the possible contingencies involved—things like the value of the asset being foreclosed, its importance to the firm’s going concern, volatility, information asymmetries that affect the availability of financing for the asset, and the creditor’s own liquidity constraints. The bankruptcy code, therefore, allows a debtor the power to alter the default rule and deprive a creditor of their foreclosure right in a plan of reorganization. This ensures that the secured creditor cannot use an incomplete foreclosure contract to hold up the debtor and other creditors by threatening to withdraw a key asset in distress.

But the bankruptcy code also imposes constraints on the debtors’ power. To deprive a secured creditor of its foreclosure right, a debtor must do one of three things in a its reorganization plan.¹³⁵ First, the debtor can give the creditor the proceeds of a sale of the asset if the creditor is allowed to bid in the sale.¹³⁶ This ensures that the ultimate buyer values the asset more than the secured creditor, eliminating the debtor’s opportunity to use the threat of a sale to extract value from the creditor. The creditor either gets the asset or gets paid more than its subjective value of the asset.

Second, the debtor can “cram down” the secured creditor by providing it with a new lien and payments that are valued against what a new loan on similar terms would cost the debtor on the market.¹³⁷ This ensures that cramdown will not give the debtor better than market terms, thus reducing the debtor’s incentive to use the threat of below market terms to extract value from the

¹³⁴ 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

¹³⁵ 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

¹³⁶ 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 11 U.S.C. § 363(k).

¹³⁷ 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). This is my view of the proper reading of the statute. See Casey, *supra* note 10 at 170. The Second Circuit has adopted this approach, but the question is unsettled in the courts. *Matter of MPM Silicones, L.L.C.*, 874 F.3d 787, 800-01(2d Cir. 2017).

creditor.¹³⁸ The only benefit the debtor gets from cramdown is eliminating the transaction costs and asymmetric information problems associated with finding a new loan.¹³⁹

Third, the debtor can provide the creditor with some form of compensation that is the “indubitable equivalent” of the creditors’ contract right.¹⁴⁰ This ensures that the court can allow for unusual solutions that are efficient and avoid the possibility of a secured creditor holding up the debtor by insisting on foreclosure when some other better solution is “indubitably” available. That last standard—“indubitable”—imposes a high burden because in most cases the court will not be able to measure the equivalence with precision.¹⁴¹

Thus, the parties must negotiate their way to payment, sale, foreclosure, a new lien, or something else. The alternative to a negotiated agreement is in the hands of one party—the party who might be held up by the default rule—who chooses between the default rule or an alteration subject to paying some value or meeting some burden of proof. The law makes certain outcomes easier or harder for parties to force on each other depending on how much the system trusts the court to protect against misbehavior by the party advocating that outcome.¹⁴² Because the debtor has the power to alter the default rule and cram a plan down on creditors—which becomes the alternative to a negotiated agreement—the debtor bears the burden of (1) providing an auction where the creditor is allowed to bid, (2) providing new loan terms that it can prove match the market, or (3) proving that it is providing an indubitable equivalent of the right that is being altered.

As another example, the bankruptcy code implements a similar but more crude approach to the assumption of executory

¹³⁸ See Casey, *supra* note 10 at 161. *MPM Silicones, L.L.C.*, 874 F.3d at 792 and 800 (debtor threatened to cram down an interest rate \$150 million below the market rate to extract procedural concessions).

¹³⁹ This does require the court to estimate the market value of the new loan. Evidence of that value is often available. Casey, *supra* note 10 at 168; *Matter of MPM Silicones, L.L.C.*, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4436335, at *11, 25–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014).

¹⁴⁰ 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).

¹⁴¹ Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, *Bankruptcy Step Zero*, 2012 S Ct Rev 203, 220 (noting that the courts’ discretion is limited by the standard of indubitable equivalence to avoid erroneous dilution of a creditor’s claim).

¹⁴² The system operates as a set of altering rules customized to the law’s expectations about hold-up behavior. For more on altering rules, see Ian Ayres, *Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules*, 121 Yale L. J. 2032 (2012) (developing a theory of altering rules).

contracts.¹⁴³ Because the stakes are lower, the code requires a more approximate measure of the market price, requiring the debtor to cure all past defaults in order to assume a contract.¹⁴⁴ Bankruptcy law, thus, allows a debtor to enforce executory contracts that it has breached.¹⁴⁵ This right ensures that the counterparty cannot use a technical breach to hold up the debtor by withdrawing a key agreement from the debtor's relationships. But the debtor must cure all past defaults.¹⁴⁶ This price is a rough estimate of the market value of the breached contract terms. It ensures that the debtor does not use bankruptcy to hold up the creditor by ignoring the value of substantive obligations in their relationship.¹⁴⁷

Throughout the code, there are price and burden allocations like this that allow a party to pay a cramdown price of sorts to alter a rule that would otherwise apply. On the one hand, the code implements this framework where the underlying terms of the parties' relationships are expected to misfire and provide hold-up opportunity. On the other hand, the prices and other limiting principles give the court comfort that the likelihood of abuse by the party altering those terms is low. Within the parameters set by these rights, prices, and limitations, the parties find their negotiating positions and bargain with each other. Thus, the code implements default rules, and then layers on altering rules¹⁴⁸ in the form of prices or other undertakings required to demonstrate a reduced risk of hold up.¹⁴⁹

C. The Balance between Ex Ante and Ex Post Concerns

Like the law of general averages, this approach takes into account ex ante incentives. In the admiralty context, you could, of course, achieve the efficient ex post outcome by transferring title

¹⁴³ 11 U.S.C. § 365. A similar analysis applies to questions about critical vendor orders. See below at note 215.

¹⁴⁴ 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A).

¹⁴⁵ 11 U.S.C. § 365.

¹⁴⁶ 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A).

¹⁴⁷ This analysis suggests a justification for the current rule. It provides a counterargument to Professor Skeel's proposal to do away with the requirement that the debtor cure prebankruptcy defaults. See David A. Skeel, Jr., *The Empty Idea of "Equality of Creditors"*, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 699, 721-22 (2017).

¹⁴⁸ For more on the theory of altering rules, see Ian Ayres, *supra* note 142.

¹⁴⁹ Examples exist throughout the bankruptcy code. I discuss two major examples in Part III. Another prominent nonprice example is the requirement that a plan of reorganization have one impaired class of creditors vote in favor of it. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). This is intended to reduce—but certainly does not eliminate—the risk that a proposed plan is an inefficient hold-up maneuver asserted against impaired creditors. This purpose of § 1129(a)(10) is clear. In practice it is not difficult to circumvent and may do very little.

to all cargo to the captain (or any decision maker) at the moment the ship hits distress.¹⁵⁰ This would efficiently align ex post control and ownership. But few would advocate for that law. The captain would do everything she could to lead the ship to distress and others would be reluctant to even bring cargo onto the ship. Similarly, few would advocate giving the ownership of all cargo to the poorest passenger when distress arises to achieve general redistributive justice. In addition to being one of the worst possible means for redistributing wealth, this measure would also distort predistress incentives by causing the poorest passenger to favor distress and distort ex ante incentives by driving other passengers out of shipping markets and perhaps leading captains to reject poor passengers altogether.

Bankruptcy law likewise considers the impact of its interventions on ex ante and predistress incentives. But unlike the law of general averages, bankruptcy law does not implement a blanket rule of average contribution. Rather it encourages the “passengers” to negotiate over their contributions under court supervision and within certain parameters.¹⁵¹

In all of this, there is no reason to think interventions that focus on ex post outcomes are per se inefficient. Consider the case of General Growth Properties.¹⁵² The court’s ruling in that case has been criticized for ignoring ex ante contracts in the service of ex post value maximization.¹⁵³ To provide a short summary, in 2009, General Growth Properties faced a liquidity crisis. The firm had a profitable business, but it owed balloon payments on loans that it could not refinance in the midst of the Great Financial Crisis. A bankruptcy filing for the whole enterprise—parent and subsidiaries—provided a solution.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ In bankruptcy, Professor Adler has made a proposal like this that gives complete ownership to a creditor class when distress hits. See Adler, *supra* note 69.

¹⁵¹ This is a form of coerced ex tempore contracting. See Andrew Verstein, *Ex Tempore Contracting*, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1869, 1881-86 (2014) (introducing the concept of privately agreed to ex tempore contracting).

¹⁵² *In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc.*, 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).

¹⁵³ See, for example, Brian M. Resnick and Steven C. Krause, *Not So Bankruptcy-Remote SPEs and In re General Growth Properties, Inc.*, 28 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 60 (2009) (noting that the case “was viewed by many market participants as inconsistent with the protections thought to be provided to lenders in structured finance transactions involving bankruptcy-remote vehicles in the event of a bankruptcy of their corporate parent”); W. Rodney Clement Jr. and H. Scott Miller, *General Growth: Special Purpose Entities (Barely) Survive First Bankruptcy Test*, *Prob. & Prop.*, Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 31, 32; Jesse Cook-Dubin, *New York Bankruptcy Court Topples Contractual Barriers to Filing Chapter 11: Part II*, 28 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 16 (2010).

¹⁵⁴ *Gen. Growth Props.*, 409 B.R. at 54-55.

There was one problem, the subsidiaries of the business were set up to be bankruptcy remote.¹⁵⁵ The legal structure of the subsidiary entities, their corporate governance documents, and their agreements with lenders ostensibly prevented them from filing for bankruptcy.¹⁵⁶ The parent caused the subsidiaries to file bankruptcy anyway.¹⁵⁷ The creditors of the subsidiary entities challenged this maneuver.¹⁵⁸ In the end, the bankruptcy court allowed the filings notwithstanding the agreements set up to prevent them.¹⁵⁹ Critics predicted that this would lead to an ex ante increase in interest rates as creditors no longer trusted the enforceability of their agreements.¹⁶⁰ There is no evidence that such increase ever occurred.

One might even predict the opposite result. At the end of the day, the General Growth bankruptcy was a great success story.¹⁶¹ All stakeholders' claims were paid in full, equity retained its value, and the company was successfully reorganized.¹⁶² It might actually demonstrate that courts are good at determining when hard-edged contract terms misfire. Perhaps the case was evidence that courts will ignore those terms if, but only if, someone has made a sufficient showing that the terms are inefficient, that they are being invoked as a hold-up maneuver, that deviating from them won't create hold up on the other side, and that an appropriate pricing mechanism has been implemented.¹⁶³ The court may have reached a high degree of confidence in its

¹⁵⁵ Id. at 63-64.

¹⁵⁶ Id.

¹⁵⁷ Id. at 54-55.

¹⁵⁸ Id. at 55.

¹⁵⁹ Id. at 69.

¹⁶⁰ See Resnick and Krause, *supra* note 153.

¹⁶¹ Ilaina Jonas, *General Growth Cleared to Exit Bankruptcy*, Reuters (Oct. 21, 2010) (noting the success of the reorganization)

¹⁶² Id. (noting the full payment of bonds and an equity value of \$5.2 billion).

¹⁶³ The court did require some significant proof on these matters. *In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc.*, 409 B.R. at 63 (noting that the ruling produced “no sacrifice of fundamental rights”); at 65 (noting the irony of the opportunistic use of “leverage” by the party trying to enforce the contract terms); at 67-70 (repeatedly noting the “good faith” of the debtor); at 69 (noting the other bankruptcy measures available to creditors to limit the debtors attempts to hold them up); at 55 (noting that the order allowing use of cash “had various forms of adequate protection... such as the payment of interest at the non-default rate, continued maintenance of the [subsidiary] properties, a replacement lien on the cash being upstreamed... and a second priority lien on certain other properties”). The court may have simply concluded that it is worth saving this one company in this unique set of circumstances because lenders will know that the threshold for such intervention is sufficiently high to avoid market distortions. But counterexamples may appear if courts are not vigilant about hold up. For example, in *Matter of MPM Silicones, L.L.C.*, the court allowed the debtor to exercise ex post control over interest rates to extract concessions and value from creditors before the opinion was reversed on appeal. 874 F.3d at 787. See Casey, *supra* note 10 at 167-68.

conclusion that the creditors of the subsidiaries were using an incomplete contract to hold up the firm and extract individual gains from the enterprise.

Indeed, if one thinks that bankruptcy disputes are rare relative to the number of firms operating in the market and if the structured-renegotiation framework is good at excluding extreme bad faith positions, then one might conclude that bankruptcy law could interfere with all kinds of nonbankruptcy entitlements to create ex post value without imposing distortionary costs on the market. The actions and statements of judges in recent bankruptcy cases are consistent with this analysis. As one prominent bankruptcy judge recently explained, bankruptcy courts are reluctant to enforce contract terms that allow a creditor to opportunistically extract extra value, noting that “bankruptcy courts have, in a variety of different contexts, struggled mightily and usually successfully to avoid giving a party a windfall.”¹⁶⁴

The question in all of this is how much we trust the process to identify these things. The system relies heavily on the parties and finds comfort when sophisticated parties have bargained vigorously toward an arm’s length resolution.¹⁶⁵ And judges do require a high level of confidence before exercising their discretion to achieve ex post value.¹⁶⁶ If we think this setup gets things wrong, then our system does not work well. If we think the courts have a good process for ruling out extreme behavior and operating within an acceptable margin of error, then the system is successful.

* * *

¹⁶⁴ Judge Brendan Shannon, *ABI’s 200th Podcast Features Judge and Academics Discussing Side Agreements in Corporate Bankruptcy*, at 27:48 available at <https://www.abi.org/podcasts/abis-200th-podcast-features-judge-and-academics-discussing-side-agreements-in-corporate> (2017); see also Ayotte, Casey, and Skeel, *supra* note 34 at 269-72 (providing a detailed analysis of the RadioShack bankruptcy suggesting that the court may have interpreted contract rights to avoid hold up and facilitate an efficient sale of assets).

¹⁶⁵ Ayotte, Casey, and Skeel, *supra* note 34 at 286 (noting that the system depends on the bargaining positions of sophisticated creditors to provide benefits to the estate as a whole); Douglas G. Baird, *Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution*, draft available at https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2435&context=law_and_economics at 17 (“Bankruptcy is designed so that the most active and vigilant creditors protect others at the same priority level.”).

¹⁶⁶ See for example, the discussion *supra* note 163 presenting the thorough nature of the judicial inquiry in the *General Growth* case. See also Shannon, *supra* note 164 at 27:48 (discussing the considerations of bankruptcy judges in dealing with contract terms that present “windfalls” in various cases).

One final and important critique might be that destroying value ex post is actually a good thing. As many—including me—have pointed out, there is a positive disciplining effect from destroying value in bankruptcy.¹⁶⁷ Parties have an incentive to avoid distress if they will be punished when distress arises.¹⁶⁸ Creditors can use that incentive as a substitute for monitoring the debtor or each other.¹⁶⁹

One could imagine a rule that allows the use of bankruptcy penalties but only if the court was sure that the penalty clause is a substitute for monitoring. Penalties like this work by making control and payment rights state contingent.¹⁷⁰ But what if the specifics of that contingency are themselves noncontractible. Defining the different states that trigger the contingency might be very difficult and that is where the structured renegotiation comes in. Bankruptcy law might treat state-contingent penalty terms as incomplete contracts that may or may not provide the opportunity for hold up depending on how things have played out in a specific case.

There is good reason to think state-contingent penalty terms are, indeed, incomplete. The tradeoff between the value preserved through ex post intervention and the ex ante discipline created by ex post penalties will always be uncertain. To put it another way, which is the first order problem—the ex ante incentives or the ex post coordination?¹⁷¹ Parties cannot know the answers to these questions when they initially write their contracts. They would have to know the actual cause of distress. For example, can one really posit that General Growth, Kodak, American Airlines, Calpine, Toy “R” Us, United Airlines, and the like all would have avoided distress if only the decision makers had known that bankruptcy would be more severe? On the other side of the

¹⁶⁷ See Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, *No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations*, 113 Col. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2013).

¹⁶⁸ Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, *An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting*, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473, 490-91 (1992).

¹⁶⁹ Id.

¹⁷⁰ Id.; Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein, *Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors*, 104 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 5-8 (1996); Jaime F. Zender, *Optimal Financial Instruments*, 46 J. Fin. 1645, 1647 (1991). This academic theory may play a minor role in practice. There are other means of punishing managers, and equity is usually wiped out in bankruptcy. The prime question in practice is whether to penalize junior creditors. Unless junior creditors are calling the shots (at least indirectly) before bankruptcy, there is little sense in punishing them after the filing. Indirect action would arise if the junior creditors were the optimal monitors. Then the penalties on them would be a way for senior creditors to “monitor the monitors.”

¹⁷¹ Professor Ayotte’s models have flagged a similar problem. See Ayotte, *supra* note 70; Ayotte, *supra* note 34.

equation, would the reorganization values have been much lower if some creditors were allowed to inflict more pain on others when distress arose? The answer is likely different for each debtor. An optimal approach would be to say that if misbehavior is likely to have occurred and may have contributed to the distress, then and only then do we want to enforce reasonable penalty terms. And it may be that judges—even though they are not great at knowing exactly how to substantively restructure a company’s finances—are pretty good at implementing the structured-renegotiation frame work to detect when distress is a result of poorly disciplined management or uncontrollable market forces and which penalty terms are worth enforcing.

D. A Limited Scope

Because bankruptcy law is not a general welfare system, it does not address problems unrelated to distress. This conceptual limitation has several justifications: 1) doctrinal reasons grounded in constitutional law and federalism;¹⁷² and 2) institutional reasons grounded in a view of the appropriate authority for making those decisions;¹⁷³ 3) efficiency reasons concerned with distorting incentives of parties in filing, avoiding, or pursuing bankruptcy;¹⁷⁴ 4) conceptual reasons grounded in semantic labeling—that is, fixing contract law problems is a contract thing.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Mooney, *supra* note 9 at 960-62, 977-78; Thomas E. Plank, *Bankruptcy and Federalism*, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1063 (2002); Robert H. George, *Bankruptcy for Nonbankruptcy Purposes: Are There any Limits?*, 6 Rev. Litig. 95, 128 (1987).

¹⁷³ George, *supra* note 172 at 128.

¹⁷⁴ Baird, *supra* note 12 at 592 n. 58 (“The basic idea is a straightforward one: If there are two different legal regimes, parties will invest considerable energy in finding the legal regime that most favors them. A rule that applies only in bankruptcy necessarily invites some parties to resolve the issue someplace else. Resources are wasted in the battle over where the fight takes place. More importantly, when the non-bankruptcy forum is actually used, any substantive policy put in place only in the bankruptcy forum will be irrelevant.”). Though it is not a corporate issue, the parking-ticket-and-bankruptcy debacle in Chicago is a great example of this. A discriminatory parking-enforcement policy in Chicago has led thousands of black debtors to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy simply because it provides the only relief to parking-ticket enforcement. This has swamped the bankruptcy courts, imported the racial disparities that exist in parking enforcement into the bankruptcy system, and cost black drivers thousands of dollars in legal fees. It is abundantly clear that a fix to the parking ticket system independent of bankruptcy law would be better. Edward R. Morrison and Antoine Uettwiller, *Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies* 173 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 174 (2017); Anthony J. Casey, *Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies: Comment on Morrison and Uettwiller*, 173 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 197 (2017).

¹⁷⁵ Baird, *supra* note 12 at 578 (“if a social policy is worth implementing in bankruptcy it should be implemented everywhere.”).

Saying that bankruptcy law should address bankruptcy matters is not the same as the Butner Principle. Bankruptcy law should be directed at bankruptcy matters. But when bankruptcy matters are in play, nothing about the structured-renegotiation theory requires special deference to nonbankruptcy rights. Rather, as demonstrated in the previous section, the theory merely requires that any measure implemented to create value in bankruptcy must not destroy more value by distorting incentives in other states of the world.

This does suggest that the farther the parties' interests are away from a relationship involving the debtors' assets the more skeptical the law should be in assuming that it can alter those interests to the collective benefit of all interested parties without causing collateral damage. Thus, bankruptcy law generally does not take into account a creditors' outside interests such as investments in a competitor when implementing bankruptcy's purpose.¹⁷⁶ Likewise, it does not consider the interests of those with no connections to the debtor.

The economics literature on incomplete contracting allows us to state this idea more formally. Incomplete contracting leads to hold-up problems when parties have made relationship-specific investments.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the bankruptcy solution to incomplete contracting over financial distress is only relevant to situations where the parties have made such investments.

Parties who have no direct or indirect relationship with the debtor have made no investments specific to a relationship affected by the debtor's financial distress and are—by definition—not subject to an incomplete contracting problem with regard to that distress. On the other hand, those who have non-claim relationships with the debtor might still be included in the partition if they have invested in those relationships.

The scope of bankruptcy is, then, the set of relationships where parties have made relationship-specific investments that are affected by the debtor's distress. Importantly, this suggests a broader scope than the Creditors' Bargain theory and a broader scope than some courts have been willing to adopt. The interest of non-claimants who have made such investments will be relevant to and subject to the bankruptcy power.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ See Baird, Casey, and Picker, *supra* note 52 at 1683.

¹⁷⁷ See above at Part II.A.iii.

¹⁷⁸ The most likely expansion will be along the dimension of human capital, which is a major relationship-specific investment associated with most firms. See Margaret Blair, *Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm*, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE

Likewise, contracts that are not directly with the debtor but reflect specific investments in the debtors' network of relationships will be bankruptcy matters. For example, consider the question of non-consensual third-party releases. Third-party releases are provisions in reorganization plans that release one party from liability on a claim held by another party even when the debtor is not a party to the claims.¹⁷⁹ The controversy arises when the party holding the claim does not consent to the release.¹⁸⁰ The structured-renegotiation theory suggests that the bankruptcy courts can release claims between creditors if 1) those claims are connected to the creditors' relationship with the debtor and 2) doing so prevents hold up and facilitates efficient ex post coordination.¹⁸¹ Of course, consistent with the structured-renegotiation theory, there also needs to be a check on the converse hold-up behavior that could arise from *allowing* such releases. That check will take the form of a cramdown payment from the debtor's estate to the party being forced to provide the release.¹⁸² The appropriate amount of that payment will be an estimate of the market value of the released claim. Alternatively, the court could request indubitable proof that the released claims have de minimis value or that the debtor is not using the releases to extract hold-up value. Once the court sets the price and evidentiary burdens, then the parties can begin their renegotiation. These measures reduce the potential for debtors to use third-party releases as a form of hold up.

Relatedly, the structured-renegotiation theory suggests that intercreditor agreements—which often bind creditors to abstain from certain procedural maneuvers in a bankruptcy proceeding—should fall under the bankruptcy umbrella even when the debtor is not a party and even when the agreements contain forum selection clauses suggesting otherwise. In practice, the hold-up risk in intercreditor agreements is high.¹⁸³ As a result, courts

GOVERNANCE at 58 (Eds. Margaret Blair and Mark Roe) (1999). In practice courts are inconsistent in how much consideration they give to these kinds of interests.

¹⁷⁹ See *In re Dow Corning Corp.*, 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) (defining third-party releases).

¹⁸⁰ *Id.*

¹⁸¹ One court has applied a standard similar to this in the related context of staying third-party litigation. *Fisher v. Apostolou*, 155 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 1998) (staying litigation that was sufficiently related to the debtor and when not granting the stay could allow one party to derail the reorganization proceedings).

¹⁸² See Baird, Casey, and Picker, *supra* note 52 at 1688 (raising the possibility of requiring such a payment).

¹⁸³ I have shown in prior work that parties use intercreditor agreements to extract value from the debtor's estate. See Ayotte, Casey, and Skeel, *supra* note 34 at 284-85; see

should not enforce them specifically unless the party seeking enforcement meets a very high evidentiary threshold to show that there is no value extraction.¹⁸⁴ But consistent with analysis above, the court should impose a market price on the party seeking to escape enforcement. That price should take the form of expectation damages under the terms of the agreement.¹⁸⁵ Once again, this system reduces the opportunities for hold up on both sides.

III. Additional Applications: Cramdown for Everything

As noted above, bankruptcy's cramdown provisions provide a clear example of the structured-renegotiation theory at work.¹⁸⁶ Along the way, I have also demonstrated the theory's application to simple questions like executory contracts¹⁸⁷ and more cutting-edge problems like third-party releases and intercreditor agreements.¹⁸⁸ But the theory is broadly applicable. One can march through the core features of bankruptcy law to see this. In this Part, I provide three additional examples.¹⁸⁹ I begin with the straightforward but core example of the automatic stay. I then turn to an example where the theory can resolve a recent split among courts. I conclude with the more complex problems of priority rules and the new value exception.

A. Further Proof of Concept: The Automatic Stay

The automatic stay is one of bankruptcy's central provisions.¹⁹⁰ It directly addresses the classic "collective action" problem.¹⁹¹ That problem is one particular type of hold up, and the bankruptcy code responds to it by implementing default rules along with special altering rules that impose price and evidentiary burdens to reduce the risk of hold up.

The bankruptcy code's default rule is that actions to enforce or recover on prepetition claims or to obtain possession of property from the estate are prohibited during bankruptcy.¹⁹² But the bankruptcy code allows a party to alter that rule if it can show

also Shannon, *supra* note 164 (noting that parties use intercreditor agreements to extract windfalls).

¹⁸⁴ Id. at 287-90.

¹⁸⁵ Id. at 287-90.

¹⁸⁶ See above at Part II.B.

¹⁸⁷ See above at Part II.B.

¹⁸⁸ See above at Part II.D.

¹⁸⁹ See also *infra* notes 215-219.

¹⁹⁰ 11 U.S.C. § 362.

¹⁹¹ See above at Part I.A. for a discussion of "collective action."

¹⁹² 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), (3) & (6).

that its interest is not adequately protected,¹⁹³ or where it can show it is enforcing an ownership right in property that is not necessary for the debtor to effectively reorganize.¹⁹⁴

These rules track the analysis presented above. Because contracts are incomplete, parties have the ability to enforce claims against a debtor in financial distress even when those claims will destroy value. A complete contract would provide specific situations when individual enforcement is allowed because it does not destroy value and specific situations where it is not allowed because it does. But ex ante uncertainty is too high to write that contract. As a result, parties can use the incompleteness to threaten to enforce claims in a way that will destroy ex post value. That threat allows them to extract value from the estate.¹⁹⁵

To combat this threat of hold up, the code's default rule prohibits claimants from exercising their rights. But that default rule itself creates a converse risk of hold up. The debtor can extract value from a claimant by threatening to eliminate its enforcement right with a bankruptcy filing. And so, the code allows the claimant to alter the default rule by meeting one of two requirements. First, the claimant can demand adequate protection for its interest from the debtor. This imposes a price of sorts that the debtor must pay to maintain the default rule. That price is set at an amount that ensures that the debtor is not using the automatic stay to extract value from the claimant.¹⁹⁶ Second, the claimant can lift the stay if it can meet a high evidentiary burden of showing that it is enforcing an ownership right that will not have a negative effect on the debtor's reorganization. This amounts to an evidentiary showing that the claimant is not trying to hold up the debtor. If the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization, then the threat to enforce against it has no hold-up value.

¹⁹³ 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

¹⁹⁴ 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, *Chrysler LLC v. Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc.*, 382 B.R. 90, 110-11 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (refusing to lift the automatic stay where a claimant was threatening an action that would shut down the debtor's business); *United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A.*, 406 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that a creditor's threat to use a special statutory provision excepting aircraft from the automatic stay will result in "tough bargaining" and allow the creditor to extract value from the estate).

¹⁹⁶ See, for example, *In re Rogers*, 239 B.R. 883, 886 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that adequate protection is set by a "pragmatic and synthetic" balancing of all relevant factors to determine the risk that the creditor will lose value by the continuation of the stay).

Collective action is but one variety of the hold-up problem associated with financial distress. Many others exist. We turn now to some of those other problems.

B. Court Splits: Sections 363(f) and 365(h)

Recently, courts have struggled over an ambiguity in the bankruptcy code regarding the fate of leases in an asset sale.¹⁹⁷ Section 363(f) of the code allows the debtor to sell its assets free-and-clear of a stakeholder's interests.¹⁹⁸ But section 365(h) provides that even if a debtor rejects a lease, the lessee retains its rights to use and possession under the lease.¹⁹⁹ The question, then, is what happens to a lessee when the debtor sells the leased property under section 363(f)? Is the sale free and clear of the lease under section 363(f) or does the lessee retain its rights under section 365(h) after the sale?

The statutory language is complicated and ambiguous at best, and courts have split on the appropriate reading. The structured-renegotiation framework provides policy guidance. Section 365(h) is addressed at reducing a hold-up threat. Lessees often make very large investments that are specific to their lease. A debtor who can threaten to terminate a lessee by filing bankruptcy, has powerful hold-up leverage. As a result, the bankruptcy code prohibits that action. It even implements a complex pricing mechanism to balance the dual risks of hold up.²⁰⁰

On the other hand, section 363(f) is also addressed at reducing a hold-up threat. Often the only way to reorganize a debtor is through a free-and-clear sale. To give one lessee the ability to veto that sale would create an enormous hold-up opportunity. Moreover, the sale through a competitive auction—which is itself a market-price test—reduces any risk that the debtor is attempting to hold up the lessee.²⁰¹ While it is likely that a debtor might use a bankruptcy filing to terminate a lease, it is not likely that it would sell its entire business to do so. Thus, as long as there is no evidence that sale is a sham, the rule that best

¹⁹⁷ *In re Spanish Peaks*, 2017 WL 2979660 (9th Cir. 2017); *Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC*, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003); *In re Dish & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC*, 510 Bankr. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

¹⁹⁸ 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).

¹⁹⁹ 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).

²⁰⁰ The lessee must pay rent, can offset any damages caused by the debtor's nonperformance of obligations, but does not otherwise have a right to collect those damages. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)-(B).

²⁰¹ The code also includes a catch all provision allowing the court to intervene where the sale is suspect. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (directing the court to prohibit a sale "as is necessary to provide adequate protection" of a stakeholder's interest).

constrains hold up on both sides is one that allows a sale free and clear of leases.²⁰²

C. Major Questions: Priority Rules and the New Value Exception

The Butner Fallacy and the Creditor's Bargain are probably most pernicious when it comes to debates about priority rules in bankruptcy. Priority rules dictate the order in which creditors are paid from the value that results after a bankrupt debtor is reorganized. In theory, the current bankruptcy system requires "absolute priority," which means that creditors are paid strictly in order of their nonbankruptcy priorities as if the firm was being liquidated.²⁰³ In reality, absolute priority is a rough guideline from which outcomes often deviate.²⁰⁴

For decades, scholars have argued about whether absolute priority is essential to a proper functioning bankruptcy system. Some scholars have proposed an alternative regime known as "relative priority," which would allow junior creditors to share in the future value of the reorganized debtor.²⁰⁵ The American Bankruptcy Institute has recently entered the fray with a proposal to adopt its own version of relative priority.²⁰⁶

Too often the debates about these priority schemes devolve to an inquiry about nonbankruptcy entitlements and whether one rule is required by the Creditors' Bargain. The conventional argument for absolute priority is that the only way to respect nonbankruptcy entitlements is to pay the creditors as if the debtor firm is being liquidated.²⁰⁷ Others have countered that absolute priority unnecessarily terminates junior investors' future interests even though the debtor is not actually

²⁰² A similar analysis might apply to the interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) on the rejection of trademark licenses. This question is currently before the Supreme Court of the United States. See *Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC*, 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018) (granting cert).

²⁰³ Walter J. Blum and Stanley A. Kaplan, *The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganization*, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 651, 654 (1974) ("[B]efore a class of investors can participate in a reorganization, all more senior classes must be compensated in full for their claims, measured on the basis of their priorities upon involuntary liquidation.").

²⁰⁴ Bebchuk and Fried, *supra* note 39 at 911-13 (noting the deviations from absolute priority); Roe and Tung, *supra* note 22 at 1269 (same).

²⁰⁵ Baird, *supra* note 21 at 789-806 (describing relative priority and its appeal).

²⁰⁶ Am. Bankr. Inst. Comm'n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 2012-2014: Final Report and Recommendations, 208-09 (2014).

²⁰⁷ Alan Schwartz, *A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy*, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1202 (2005); Barry E. Adler and Ian Ayres, *A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy*, 111 Yale L. J. 83, 88-90 (2001); Jackson, *supra* note 1 at 869 (the creditors' bargain "requires respecting a secured creditor's ability to be paid first").

liquidated.²⁰⁸ A relative priority system that kept those future interests alive might, they argue, be more consistent with the Creditors' Bargain.²⁰⁹

These debates are not asking the right question. The right question is whether one system does a better job at reducing the hold-up problem. Any system that allows the debtor to file bankruptcy to significantly reduce the value of a senior creditor's claim would create incentives for debtors and junior investors to threaten a bankruptcy filing in order to extract a hold-up payment. On the other hand, a bankruptcy rule that entitles secured creditors to destroy significant option value that belongs to junior creditors would also lead to a hold-up problem.

As we have seen throughout this Article, the structured-renegotiation theory provides that bankruptcy law should implement a default rule that can be altered subject to pricing mechanisms and evidentiary burdens. The most obvious default rule—which is consistent with either absolute or relative priority—is that the debtor must pay a senior secured creditor at least what that creditor would have received in a nonbankruptcy foreclosure.²¹⁰ Setting that rule ensures that the debtor cannot hold up senior creditors by threatening bankruptcy as a means to underpay them.²¹¹

But—within the structured-renegotiation framework—this baseline can be altered if the debtor meets certain requirements. A proper priority rule might include exceptions for rare cases when one party can show that another party is indubitably asserting its priority rights as part of a hold-up threat. Another exception might allow small deviations when the parties advocating them can show—by evidence or market tests—that those deviations are efficient and not part of a hold-up attempt.

The “new value exception” to priority that courts apply in our current bankruptcy system matches that last category of

²⁰⁸ Jacoby and Janger (2018), *supra* note 9 at 678-81 (arguing against absolute priority and in favor of a relative-priority-like “equitable realization” based on nonbankruptcy entitlements); Jacoby and Janger (2014), *supra* note 9 at 913 (noting that sales under absolute priority terminate junior creditors' interest in the future value of the firm); Baird, *supra* note 21 at 793; Anthony J. Casey, *The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11*; 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 764-65 (2011).

²⁰⁹ Casey, *supra* note 208 at 773.

²¹⁰ I have argued elsewhere for this baseline payment as part of a relative priority mechanism. Casey, *supra* note 208 at 765.

²¹¹ This analysis suggests that a recent controversial case was wrongfully decided. The court in *In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership* interpreted the bankruptcy code to allow the debtor to confirm a plan that left the secured creditor holding a lien that was worth less than the foreclosure value of its claim. *In re Sunnyslope Housing Limited Partnership*, 859 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2017).

exceptions. The new value case law provides that old equity owners of an insolvent firm can only take a stake in the reorganized firm if they pay for that stake and if the payment is market tested.²¹² Once again, the rule operates to curb hold up on both sides. Old equity owners often exercise control in the bankruptcy process, especially in smaller firms where they serve as managers. There is a constant risk that they will use that control to hold up other stakeholders. On the flip side, the owners, managers, and founders of a debtor firm might be valuable to its going concern and it might be in the interest of the whole estate to include them in the reorganization. If one creditor could absolutely veto the owners' involvement going forward, that creditor would possess a threat to derail the whole process. By allowing the owners' involvement only after a robust market test, the new value exception implements the structured-renegotiation framework to navigate between these two threats.²¹³

Notably, the priority guidance in this part provides a range of solutions that might take the form of modified absolute or relative priority. The key takeaway is that the structured-renegotiation theory does not require one specific form of priority. Rather it simply gives us parameters within which any chosen priority regime must operate. Notably, the American Bankruptcy Institute's relative priority proposal does not explicitly include a requirement that the debtor's estate pay senior creditors an amount equal to the nonbankruptcy liquidation value of their

²¹² *Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 N LaSalle Street P'Ship*, 526 U.S. 434, 437 (1999); see also Randolph J. Haines, *The Unwarranted Attack on New Value*, 72 Am. Bankr. L. J. 387 (1998) (describing the new value exception); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, *Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost*, 1999 S. Ct. Rev. 393 (same).

²¹³ This analysis is important for bankruptcy systems in other countries as well. For example, questions about new value and owner involvement in reorganization have been front and center in debates about bankruptcy reforms in India. After India introduced its bankruptcy reform in 2016, there was concern that owners were planning to use their control of the firm to hold up creditors and remain in control of firms after reorganization. Deepshikha Sikarwar, *Big Tweak in Insolvency Law on the Cards, Defaulters May be Barred from Bidding*, The Economic Times, Nov. 14, 2017, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/big-tweak-in-insolvency-law-on-cards-defaulters-may-be-barred-from-bidding/articleshow/61634341.cms>. In response, the government amended the statute to prohibit the original owners of a firm from participating in the reorganization. Litigants challenged the controversial provision's validity in court. On January 25, 2019, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the validity of the entire bankruptcy law including the amendment. Samanwaya Rautray, *Supreme Court Upholds Bankruptcy Code, Rejects Promoters' Challenges*, The Economic Times, Jan. 22, 2019, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/supreme-court-upholds-insolvency-law-in-entirety/articleshow/67683544.cms>.

claims.²¹⁴ Without that requirement, it is inconsistent with the structured-renegotiation theory.

Conclusion

The Creditors' Bargain theory cannot bear its status as the core theory of bankruptcy. At best it is a rule of thumb or analogy for the idea that we should do what is efficient across all states of the world. But it does not state a full theory. Over the years, the Creditors' Bargain theory and the Butner Fallacy have overgrown other ideas within bankruptcy scholarship. This Article is an attempt to clear the brush and discover corporate bankruptcy's fundamental theory.

The theory that emerges is one of corporate bankruptcy law as a solution to the ubiquitous incomplete contracting problem associated with financial distress. That solution takes the form of a structured-renegotiation framework. The framework limits hold-up opportunity by allowing parties to renegotiate their relationships within a system that allocates certain decision powers, places prices and evidentiary burdens on the exercise of those powers, and then subjects the resulting decisions to high-level judicial oversight. The specifics of this framework are targeted at reducing the worst and most likely instances of hold up that can block coordinated renegotiation efforts.

As I noted above, this theory is broadly applicable to explain bankruptcy's core features and to resolve its thorniest problems. While I gave various examples, space does not permit a full catalog of applications. A similar analysis can be applied to various other questions that have challenged courts, like critical

²¹⁴ Am. Bankr. Inst. Comm'n To Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 2012–2014: Final Report and Recommendations, 208-09, 218 (2014).

vendor orders,²¹⁵ settlements,²¹⁶ gifting,²¹⁷ debtor-in-possession financing,²¹⁸ and opt out mechanisms.²¹⁹

The descriptive claim of this Article is that these and other core issues fit within the structured-renegotiation framework. The normative claim is that this framework provides an efficient and well-functioning system of corporate reorganization. Future empirical research should test that normative claim, perhaps

²¹⁵ See *In re Kmart*, 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004). Critical vendor orders allow the debtor to pay a chosen vendor on prepetition claims—ahead of other creditors—to entice the vendor to continue doing business with the debtor. The result is similar to what happens when a debtor assumes an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365. See above at Part II.B. The relationship continues, and the counterparty gets paid ahead of other creditors. But there are two differences. First, the counterparty has the option of walking away. The debtor cannot coercively extend the relationship. Second, the debtor must meet a higher burden in proving that vendor is critical. *Kmart*, 359 F.3d at 866. The structured-renegotiation framework can explain this approach. A relationship counterparty can hold up a debtor even when their relationship is not a formal contract. But without the contract, the converse risk of a debtor using bankruptcy to hold up the counterparty is exacerbated. Evidence about the purpose and intended duration of the relationship is scant, and a debtor who could coercively extend the relationship might use a bankruptcy filing to extract value. On the other hand, the relationship might have value and so the law allows the debtor to pay to extend it—even over the objection of other creditors. Those objections may be attempts to block the payment just to hold up the estate. Again, we worry also about converse debtor misbehavior and hold up in the form of funneling value from the estate to one vendor. And so, the law requires the debtor to make a high evidentiary showing that the payment is efficient and not part of a hold up scheme. *Id.* at 873 (“[I]t is necessary to show not only that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation ... but also that the supposedly critical vendors would have ceased deliveries if old debts were left unpaid while the litigation continued.”).

²¹⁶ *Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.*, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). In addressing the question of whether a debtor can agree to receive a settlement payment that requires it to alter the payment priority of creditors, the Supreme Court narrowly ruled that such alterations are prohibited when they are part of a dismissal order or other final disposition of the case. *Id.* at 984-86. Consistent with the analysis throughout this Article, final dispositions are likely to be the situations where hold-up risk is at its highest. The Court left open the possibilities of interim alterations where the hold-up risk is lower, and where the debtor can meet an evidentiary burden of showing that the alteration “would ‘enable a successful reorganization and make even disfavored creditors better off.’” *Id.* at 985 (quoting *In re Kmart*, 359 F.3d at 872). Consistent with the structured-renegotiation theory’s focus on relationship-specific investments, the court also pointed out that the prohibited alterations “do[] not preserve the debtor as a going concern, ... [and] do[] not protect reliance interests.” *Id.* at 986.

²¹⁷ *In re ICL Holding Co., Inc.*, 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015) (allowing side payments, or gifts, that violated priority rules in a case where the harm to the disfavored creditor was likely insignificant).

²¹⁸ Transcript of Final Hearing on Motion for Post-Petition Financing, *In re Lyondell Chem. Co.*, No. 09-10023 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009) (approving a debtor-in-possession loan that included extreme terms drastically altering nonbankruptcy rights and shifting power to creditors because it was evident that no other source of funding existed and the alternative was liquidation).

²¹⁹ *In re Franchise Services of N. America, Inc.* 891 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2018) (approving a structure that allowed one stakeholder the power to veto a bankruptcy filing without discussion of the possibility of hold-up or the impact that such veto would have on structured renegotiation).

through comparison to other jurisdictions where the reorganization systems do not adopt the same framework.

It is worth noting that for the normative claim to be true, courts must be able to set the necessary prices in the framework with some degree of accuracy. Throughout this Article, I have discussed price mechanisms by which the courts test the efficiency and hold-up risk associated with certain decisions. For those price tests to work, the court needs to value the relevant assets, claims, and outcomes. This may be the Achilles heel of the structured-renegotiation approach. Judicial valuation is messy and imperfect.²²⁰ That said, it is not completely broken, and it can be fixed.²²¹ If anything, the analysis I have presented highlights the importance of research and reform agendas that focus on valuation procedures and methodologies as the key to improving the functioning of our structured-renegotiation system of corporate bankruptcy.

²²⁰ See Kenneth Ayotte and Edward R. Morrison, *Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy*, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819 (2018); Diane Lourdes Dick, *Valuation in Chapter 11: The Dangers of an Implicit Market Test*, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1487, 1501 (2017); Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, *Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain*, 115 Yale L.J. 1930, 1953 (2006); Anthony J. Casey and Julia Simon-Kerr, *A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation*, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1175, 1177 (2015); Keith Sharfman, *Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes*, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 357, 358–60 (2003).

²²¹ See Dick, *supra* note 220 at 1501-02 (considering proposals to improve valuation); Casey and Simon-Kerr, *supra* note 220 at 1198-1210 (proposing a new approach to judicial valuation); Sharfman, *supra* note 220 at 372-77 (same).